







# MOHINGA MATTERS

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# Recap

Folks, exactly three years ago, the fate of our country was robbed by Min Aung Hlaing. In nine months, it will mark four years since we cast our votes amidst raging COVID-19 and elected the government we wanted, which was definitely not this military rule. Ever since, Min Aung Hlaing has been ruling the country without our will for almost as long as one presidential term.

In three years, Myanmar has never been in worse shape. Currently, conflicts are raging left, right, and center, the economy is freefalling accompanied by the foreign currency crisis and shortage of imported goods including fuel. Brain drain is inevitable as the country is no longer a place where youth can thrive, and the end of policing mechanisms can no longer provide the rule of law in society, just to highlight a few.

On the bright side, the fall of the military regime has never seemed closer now. Operation 1027 rekindled the spirit of revolution across the country and managed to seize multiple outposts of the military in Northern Shan State. In the first week of January, the regime's Regional Operations Command (Laukkai) fell as its leader surrendered to the Alliance. United Wa State Army (UWSA) which has distanced itself from Myanmar's politics since the coup was seen taking control of some towns that the Alliance sieged. The regime and the Alliance reached an agreement after having dialogues with the mediation facilitated by China on January 10 and 11. However, the Alliance stated that the regime violated the agreement and its troops triggered more clashes in the frontline.

Elsewhere, ethnic armed groups, together with the People's Defence Force (PDFs) and Local De-

fence Forces (LDFs), opened war fronts in several parts of the country in solidarity with the Three Brotherhood Alliance. Intense clashes were observed in Karen State, Karenni (Kayah) State, and Sagaing Region. Several military analysts speculate that the flames of war will continue to ignite in 2024.

To this spreading wildfire of clashes, the regime responds with the only way it knows how: indiscriminate artillery shelling and aerial attacks. Not a single day went by without reading about the regime's artillery shelling and indiscriminate attacks in conflict areas which led to the displacement of thousands of people. In early January, UNOCHA reported that more than 2.6 million people had been displaced from their homes at the end of 2023, and more than 600,000 people were displaced after October 2023.

There is no denying that Myanmar's refugee spillover has become a regional issue. As a longtime haven for Myanmar's displaced people, Thai authorities understand the severity of this crisis, and its new government has been outspoken about the current situation on the international stage. In December, the Thai government even volunteered to take the lead in facilitating peace dialogues in Myanmar although the neighboring countries are following the leadership of ASEAN. In January, Thailand's prime minister announced an agreement between the Thai government and the military council to provide humanitarian assistance to the displaced population. He also urged ASEAN and other countries to contribute to the effort to bring peace to Myanmar.

Meanwhile, ASEAN is now chaired

by Laos and recently appointed a longtime diplomat Alounkeo Kit-tikhoun as the special envoy for Myanmar. He traveled to Naypyidaw to meet with junta chief Min Aung Hlaing and seven ethnic armed groups that maintain good relations with the military regime. ASEAN seems to stick to the five-point consensus as its primary policy to deal with Myanmar although progress has yet to be made in the past three years.

Even when everything seems to fall apart, the pro-democracy public has never been more devoted to a regime change than this time. Livelihood seems to be more strenuous with the rising cost of living, the regime's terrors, and instability and insecurity all around the country. But those do not stop the public from supporting the anti-regime movement in any capacity. The National Unity Government (NUG) reiterated the overwhelming support from the public and promised more capture of cities and establishment of administration this year. (Read more in our exclusive interview with Nay Phone Latt inside the issue.)

In 2024, more than 50 countries will hold elections worldwide. Since the coup in 2021, Min Aung Hlaing has repeatedly said that he'd hold an election and transfer power to the winning political party. Maybe he will eventually do so this year after stealing the country for a full presidential term and seeing the terrible state of the country during his rule. One certain thing is that we are determined to bring the power back even if we are left with nothing but ashes. Because the people of Myanmar are like phoenixes, we will rise from ashes.

**January 1, 2024**

In Ye township, Mon state, drones targeted LIB 591 and LIB 583 of the regime's forces the junta army, resulting in the death of three soldiers from the YGF-League Guerrilla Army (Dona Line Division-3) by small arms fire.

**January 3, 2024**

The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) issued a statement declaring that their forces successfully shot down a military helicopter belonging to the junta in Winmaw township, Kachin state. The Russian-made Mi-17 helicopter was targeted while en route to reinforce troops stationed near Naphawt Station, situated close to Laizar, which serves as the headquarters of KIA.

U Ye Wa Ta, a monk and member of the Mandalay Sanga Union, was apprehended by the regime's soldiers at Myinwunmingyi Monastery in Mahaangmyay township, Mandalay. The soldiers conducted a raid on the monastery using four trucks to locate him.

**January 6, 2024**

Coup leader Min Aung Hlaing held a meeting with leaders from political parties in Naypyitaw to discuss the upcoming election where he reiterated the regime's goal to transfer power to election winners.

**January 7, 2024**

Two separate aerial assaults occurred—one on the village school and another on a residential ward in Ka Nan Village, Khampat Town. These strikes resulted in the tragic deaths of at least ten civilians, leaving over twenty individuals injured. The victims, spanning ages from an elderly 90-year-old to an 8-year-old child, suffered severe disfigurement from the explosions, hindering immediate identification.

**January 10, 2024**

TNLA released a video on their YouTube channel on January 10, featuring Brigadier General Min Min Tun, a high-ranking prisoner of war, captured during Operation 1027. The 48-year-old former commander of Infantry Division 101, based in Pakokku, Magway, was arrested by the TNLA on December 15 during the battle to capture Namsan.

**January 2, 2024**

The regime's artillery struck Kawlin town, which was under the control of the NUG, in Sagaing Region, resulting in civilian casualties.

Forces stationed in Wuntho Town fired at least six artillery rounds, targeting Kawlin East Market, claiming the lives of six individuals and injuring two others.

**January 4, 2024**

To mark the Independence Day, the regime pardoned about 9,652 prisoners including some political prisoners from prisoners across the country. A total of 114 Foreigner inmates were also released and deported to their respective countries.

**January 5, 2024**

The flag of the United Wa State Army (UWSA), was seen rising in Hopang town after the Three Brotherhood Alliance seized the town as part of Operation 1027 which raised questions on the Wa's involvement.

Sun Weidong, China's deputy minister for foreign affairs, visited Naypyitaw and held a meeting with coup leader Min Aung Hlaing to discuss the stability in border areas. The Chinese official came after the news had broken about heavy artillery from Laukkai clashes falling into China's side and injuring Chinese citizens.

**January 9, 2024**

Alounkeo Kittikhoun, a veteran diplomat from Laos, is slated to assume the role of the special envoy to Myanmar after serving as a former minister in the prime minister's office.

**January 11, 2024**

Pado Saw Kwe Htoo Win, President of the Karen National Union (KNU), emphasized that armed struggle remains the sole recourse to dismantle the military regime, and requested all ethnic groups and civilians to cooperate together to fight against the junta.

### **January 12, 2024**

UNOCHA issued a new update, stating that more than 2.6 million people in Myanmar have been displaced from their homes by the end of 2023. The report specified that an estimated 628,000 people have been displaced due to intensified clashes that broke out in October 2023.

Following the surrender of Laukkai Regional Operation Command, six brigadier generals who led the Laukkai ROC were transported to Lashio, and they have been detained in Northeastern Regional Command. On January 12, news circulated that the military tribunal plans to prosecute the six brigadier generals.

### **January 16, 2024**

Military supporters including ultranationalist Ma-Ba-Tha monks staged a protest calling junta chief Min Aung Hlaing to resign and to be replaced with deputy chief Soe Win in Pyin Oo Lwin. The protest was led by a second generation of Ma-Ba-Tha monks, and protesters demand coup leader Min Aung Hlaing to leave the military and to take a minister position in the government.

In the ongoing battle in Namphatka village, Kut Khaing Township, Northern Shan State, KIA successfully shot down a regime jet fighter as confirmed by a KIA spokesperson.

### **January 19, 2024**

Pauktaw, situated near the Rakhine State's capital Sittwe, was reportedly captured by the AA according to local residents. The conflict in the area originated from an AA attack on a police station on November 15, 2023, leading to prolonged fighting.

Fierce fighting was reportedly escalating in Momeik Town, Northern Shan state where the regime's forces imposed blockades by closing the Momeik Bridge and city entrances and exits, as reported by residents. Residents were attempting to break out of the city.

### **January 21, 2024**

KIA reported that they successfully attacked and seized a regime outpost near Manwengyi village in Mansi Township, Kachin State. The joint forces of the KIA conducted a three-day assault from January 19 to 21, resulting in the capture of 30 junta soldiers including a deputy battalion commander.

### **January 14, 2024**

The junta's military reportedly set fire to over 100 houses in the rural area of Paungde township, located in the western part of Bago Region. According to local revolutionaries, a 50-member column from LID 66 arrived and burned down 33 houses in Mau Kwin village, as well as 72 houses in Taung Khamauk village.

### **January 15, 2024**

The working committee announced that the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) Congress will be held from January 20 to 23. The Congress will be chaired by CDM professors, representatives from labor organizations, chairperson of Pa-O National Federal Council Khun Myint Tun, Dr Zaw Wai Soe and Dr Thein Oo from the NUG.

### **January 18, 2024**

Major General AKM Nazmul Hasan, Director-General of Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB), paid a visit to Bangladesh's borders with Rakhine state. During his visit, he instructed border guard units to check the defense systems and to remain vigilant for any illegal activity.

Thailand agreed with the military council to provide humanitarian aid for displaced people according to Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister Parnpree Bahiddha Nukara.

### **January 20, 2024**

Locals reported that Abbot U Wayama, the secretary of the Sangha Union in Mataya township, Mandalay region, passed away while undergoing treatment for injuries sustained after being arrested and interrogated by the regime's forces. The 70-year-old abbot, known for his kindness, was arrested in his monastery in Htanpinkone village on November 12, 2023.



**January 22, 2024**

The NUG announced that the military council suffered a severe defeat, losing control of hundreds of military outposts in the conflicts confronted by ethnic armed groups and resistance forces. Due to its defeat, the military council used chemical weapons in its offensives in Shan-North. The statement also said that the people's revolution has taken a different turn in late 2023 and that anti-regime forces have gained control of border trade in border areas with China, India and Thailand.

**January 25, 2023**

Chinese embassy in Myanmar announced that its ambassador Mr. Chen Hai held a meeting with the regime-appointed Deputy Foreign Minister U Than Swe in Naypyitaw. The meeting was also joined by Lt General Tun Tun Naung from the Ministry of Border Affairs and U Aung Naing Oo from the Union Government Office.

**January 27, 2024**

The Karen National Union (KNU) announced that the regime troops abandoned three military camps, including Htinshuutaung camp, Busakhi camp, and Theemupawsoe camp, which were located in territories controlled by the KNU for 28 years in Taungoo District, Bago.

**January 29, 2024**

The Southern Regional Command of the People's Defense Force (PDF) confirmed that a military council helicopter was shot down in Thingan Nyi Naung, killing about five soldiers including Brigadier General Aye Min Naung, the commander of the LID 44.

**January 31, 2024**

The regime handed over six alleged online scam bosses to China.  
NUG, CNF, KNPP and KNU released the joint statement with five objectives, envisioning the establishment of a federal democratic union.

**January 23, 2024**

UNHCR issued a statement which stated that at least 569 Rohingya people were either lost or died in Southeast Asian waters while they fled Myanmar or Bangladesh by boats. The UN refugee agency also flagged the need for urgent action by the international community to address this situation.

**January 24, 2024**

The Three Brotherhood Alliance issued a statement and said that the military regime has been violating the Haigan Agreement which was reached to ceasefire in Northern Shan state. The statement highlighted that the regime launched an attack in Mupan district with two of its columns resulting in one death from the MNDAA side.

**January 26, 2024**

Coup leader Min Aung Hlaing said that self-administration must be approved by the parliament in a security meeting held in Naypyitaw. He emphasized that some demanded self-administration and self-determination outside of the legal system, but self-administration cannot be obtained with armed resistance.

**January 28, 2024**

The Karenni National Defense Force (KNDF) announced that joint forces had successfully taken control of Mawchi town in Farsaung township in Karenni State. According to a KNDF official, the regime troops from various camps and checkpoints in the Mawchi region withdrew without any fighting.

**January 30, 2024**

A Thai court released Tun Min Latt, a Myanmar businessman closely associated with the military junta, of multiple charges, including drug trafficking, money laundering, and transnational crime. Tun Min Latt, 54, along with three others, was cleared of 32 suspected violations, including drug trafficking and related charges. The presiding judge stated that the evidence presented by the police was insufficient to demonstrate any wrongdoing, leading to the acquittal.

# Junta No More 2024!

## What's Next?

It has been three years since the military staged a coup in Myanmar, ousting the democratically-elected government. It has been three painful years that the people have resisted the junta's aggression. Stepping into 2024, the fall of dictatorship seems to be in sight. In the only area where the junta cares, i.e. the military front, Min Aung Hlaing's troops, stretched thin across war fronts across the country, faces severe depletion of human, material, and financial resources. Militias formerly allied with the junta or took a neutral stance, sensing its worsening situation are now increasingly distancing themselves. The most embarrassing incident for the junta Min Aung Hlaing's administration, the State Administration Council (SAC), before its three-year birthday is that its soldiers surrendering en-masse at strategically important and well-fortified towns, handing over the large inventory of weapons to the enemies.

After antagonizing the citizens and their soldiers not putting up a fight, the fall of Min Aung Hlaing, deemed unlikely in February 2021, now becomes a matter of when rather than if, and that when is soon. One year from now, when the Mohinga Matters team publishes the 4th year edi-

tion of Freedom Memoirs, there is a possibility that we will be discussing developments since the fall of the junta.

However, it does not mean that the junta is not dangerous. While the junta's troops proved ineffective in fighting against other armed groups, they remained committed to unleashing atrocities on the civilians. Consequently, civilian casualties and destructions, wanton arrests, and other violations at the hands of the junta's troops remain alarmingly high. This highlights the junta's unwillingness to compromise and disregard for civilian lives even at a time of being cornered. The human and economic costs would remain high so long as the junta remains in power.

What's going on in Myanmar in the past three years proved harmful to the interests of any stakeholder, be it the people, Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs), neighboring countries, or even the junta's military itself. Thus, the removal of the junta remains a priority for each one of these stakeholders to protect their interests. However, foreseeing the end of the junta in sight, it becomes critically important for all stakeholders, both domestic and international, to create



a peaceful order in post-junta Myanmar. The way we see is the removal of a dictatorship, despite the heavy cost in terms of lives and development, becomes inevitable when the people are dedicated and resilient enough. The people of Myanmar got nothing short of full marks for this test. However, with the junta gone, another task of paramount importance is to establish a new order where disagreements and grievances could be addressed at courts and through dialogues rather than through violence.

Here, we will be discussing the roles of some of the key major stakeholders in creating a stable and peaceful Myanmar.

The first stakeholder is the National Unity Government (NUG). The 2020 General Elections reflected the genuine will of the majority people of Myanmar in a democratic manner. Even considering the glaring flaws of the winning party National League for Democracy (NLD), the election was free and fair and to completely neglect it would be a blatant disregard for the people's choice and the democratic process. However, we are not advocating MPs from the 2020 General Election to form a government after the fall of the junta, nor such is the will of any stakeholders (including the NUG)

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**“No better outcome could be expected if the fall of the junta created a power vacuum and paved the way for a failed state.”**



in Myanmar. However, with the junta gone, the NUG would play a critical role in drawing frameworks for the future of Myanmar in coordination with other stakeholders, primarily EROs. However, EROs would not be the only influential stakeholders that NUG would have to engage, neighboring countries, civil society organizations (CSOs), and every single domestic or foreign actor who has interests in Myanmar and has practical means to get involved would want a say in shaping the future of Myanmar, and the NUG would be in an enviable position of balancing everyone's interests to ensure that federal democracy, peace, and prosperity can take hold in future Myanmar. The NUG would prepare itself and build its capacity and resources with this challenging task in mind.

Another key stakeholder is the armed groups, particularly the EROs. Since the Independence from the British Empire (and the beginning of the civil war), the military has repeatedly and successfully played the divide-and-conquer method among EROs to avoid multiple simultaneous fronts. However, the junta can no longer play the same trick, and now EROs and allied People's Defence Forces (PDF) are giving the junta's forces no rest. Furthermore, the near total lack of public support towards the junta means armed groups that are traditionally allied with the junta have declined in influence and power while those who opposed the junta have grown remarkably by leveraging anti-junta public sentiment and developments over the past three years. Moreover, the unreliability and incapability of the SAC became obvious in the fall of the junta's staunch allies Kokang warlords of Laukkai, which caused other allied warlords such as Karen

Border Guard Force (BGF) leader Saw Chit Thu to reevaluate their options and distance from the junta. The armed groups, EROs or otherwise, would come to hold the key to the future of the people of Myanmar. Ultimately, from the point of the junta's fall, whether we could walk towards a federal democratic country where peace, justice, and human dignity prevail or we descend into further chaos will depend on coordination and dialogues between all stakeholders, but primarily among EROs and between EROs and the NUG. Having said that, the joint statement of 31 January 2024 by Chin National Front, Karenni National Progressive Party, Karen National Union, and the NUG, particularly, **"Point B: to ensure that all armed forces operate solely under the command of a civilian government elected through democratic processes."**, highlight the recognition on the importance of this daunting task.

The international community would also play an important role. Although different countries would have different incentives, the common consensus could be having Myanmar as a conflict-prone failed state would pose economic and security challenges to the national interests of neighboring and regional countries primarily, and other countries from afar secondarily. This has been proved in the case of cyber scam factories where transnational crime syndicates have enslaved thousands of people from Myanmar and regional countries and scammed billions of dollars from people all over the world in post-coup Myanmar. If increased lawlessness in the aftermath of the coup gave way to these crime syndicates to exploit, no better outcome could be expected if the fall of the jun-

ta created a power vacuum and paved the way for a failed state. Therefore, it is imperative for the international community to facilitate conditions required for domestic stakeholders of post-junta Myanmar to address grievances through dialogue and not through arms. This will also be in line with the economic interests of neighboring countries since their economic interests typically extend beyond the control of a single entity.

For immediate actions, the removal of the junta remains a priority. And the dedication towards such a goal has never been in doubt. However, it remains murky when it comes to life after the junta. Now would be the time for domestic and international stakeholders to hold dialogues on this issue openly and in good faith.



*Weekly Updates*

**We write weekly to document the coup, to share our experience, and to contemplate.**

**The daily entries can be read here:**

<https://mohingamatters.com/weekly-updates/>

# Reflections & Prospects on the Coup: An Interview with Nay Phone Latt

This February 1<sup>st</sup> marks the third year since the military staged the coup. In this issue, we interviewed Nay Phone Latt, the spokesperson of the Prime Minister's Office of the National Unity Government (NUG) which is the forerunner of Myanmar people's pro-democracy struggle. As customary, we discussed the events of the past year and gained insights into the NUG's outlook for the future.


**MM: It has been three years since Min Aung Hlaing & co. staged the coup. As people helping the resistance from the outside, we feel the time has flown swiftly. Undoubtedly, it must have been awfully long for those who are being detained, and imprisoned, and those who are at the frontline battling against the regime's forces. How did time pass for an official of the NUG like yourself?**

NPL: Personally, I find these three years to be extremely long. In ordinary circumstances, people enjoy their lives, meet friends, spend time with family, and engage in work, allowing time to pass seemingly unnoticed. However, during this period of significant revolution, stress is our

constant companion. Initially, I never thought a coup would happen; such an event was assumed to belong to the past. But when peaceful protesters were met with violence, it became our reality. Over these three years, we have received both good and bad news, with the latter often involving heart-breaking obituaries, reports of heavy weapons causing harm, and the loss of innocent lives, including children and grandparents. Daily news highlights the burning of villages. For me, these three years have been emotionally challenging. Those who have lost their families, homes, and friends must bear an even greater pain.

**MM: After three years, the public seems absolutely fed up with the hope for international support, people remain 100% reliant on the People's Defense Force (PDF) for the liberation of the country. Are you on the same page with the people or do you still have realistic expectations from the international community?**

NPL: I believe everyone remembers the moment when a young child held a protest sign in front of an embassy, questioning how many more people must die be-



fore receiving help from the UN. At that time, we hoped for the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). While there has been some assistance, it's evident that it falls short of what is truly needed. In the context of Myanmar's internal conflict compared to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, certain countries may feel constrained in offering aid. Despite the available assistance, it is still insufficient. If there is a genuine desire to stand united with the people of Myanmar and achieve their aspirations, the international community must provide more effective support. Throughout the three years of the revolution, we have often asserted that we must rely on ourselves. The recent positive news, from victories in battlefields to the capture of cities, demonstrates the remarkable progress made. Ethnic revolution forces have successfully captured 32 cities, some of which already have established administrations. The NUG government has announced the establishment of public administration in Kawlin. While international support has played a role, the primary force behind this progress is the unwavering support of our people. There are individuals who earn as little as 1,000 Kyats per day as laborers and contribute 500 Kyats to the revolution. This illustrates the revolutionary spirit among the people.

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**“We recognize the importance of our neighbors and are open to cooperation, even if not everything can be shared with the public.”**



**MM: In terms of international discussions, we often hear about the UN, China, ASEAN, and Thailand. But what about India? It's a powerful neighboring country, but India's stance on the revolution still seems unclear. Can you share what plans the NUG has to get India involved?**

NPL: Honestly, we haven't overlooked our neighbors. Good or bad, they are our neighbors, and we're actively engaging with all of them, including ASEAN, China, and India. However, their perspectives differ. While we see the NUG as the legitimate government, some neighboring countries view the military group as the existing power and maintain relationships with them. But they are also in contact with the NUG. Beyond India and China, we've established relations with other neighbors, but the details of these agreements can't be disclosed publicly. Every meeting comes with conditions including non-disclosure requests. We recognize the importance of our neighbors and are open to cooperation, even if not everything can be shared with the public.

**MM: When the NUG published its policy on China, lots of people, especially the young resistance crowd, criticized it by stressing how China has been supporting the junta. They reminded that the Milk Tea Alliance showed support to Myanmar's pro-democracy struggle. With this policy, they said that the NUG ignored the alliance we made along the way. What is your response?**

NPL: This approach is not exclusive to the NUG. It has been a consistent policy across successive governments. Simultaneously, we maintain relations with countries that may not be entirely comfortable with China. In the

**“The contrasting spirits between younger PDF fighters, filled with anger at their inability to fight, and the apparent disinterest of junta troops, play a crucial role in determining outcomes.”**

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realm of international relations, our top priority is the swift success of our revolution. It's crucial to be pragmatic in this pursuit. I want to clarify that supporting China's policy does not mean neglecting other considerations. We engage with various countries, initiate discussions on these matters, and provide explanations to foster understanding.

**MM: Recent developments in the battlefields have been encouraging. However, some people only tend to acknowledge the accomplishments of the Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs) and emphasize that those results are unrelated to the NUG. Specifically, resistance forces in ethnic regions have shot down fighter jets and claimed territories while the NUG-controlled areas are still struggling to reap similar rewards. What is your response to that?**

NPL: For those who raise such questions, I encourage them to explore and read the statements made by ERO leaders. Even the ERO leaders themselves have openly acknowledged the collaboration with the NUG. We are not simply taking credit for what others have conquered. There have been political agreements, notably during Operation 1027. Military agreements were discussed and documented. Recently, I noticed a reference to the principle of refraction of light in a statement by the Three Brotherhood

Alliances. It's like seeing depth not in its actual form but in appearance depth. Similar to the international relations I mentioned earlier, our relationship with ERO operates on such terms. Coordinated meetings involve spoken agreements, and certain aspects need to be further articulated. As the NUG, we cannot publicly disclose specific details about our meetings, agreements, and the parties involved due to external pressures from certain countries and neighboring nations. When analyzing Myanmar's political landscape, you cannot simply understand from surface-level observations. We must consider hidden dynamics and try to see behind what is visible. Fighting the terrorist army is not a task that the NUG or EROs can achieve independently; especially without the collective support of the people. The NUG and EROs recognize each other's strengths and actively cooperate daily. While we may not reveal every detail at this moment, there will come a time when the entire picture becomes clear.

**MM: In various locations, the NUG is engaging in judicial proceedings. In Kawlin, we observe the efforts to open the first branch of the Spring Development Bank. Beyond the armed revolution, it's evident that administrative tasks are being undertaken. However, such endeavors, including opening a bank, come with inherent**

**risks. What are your thoughts on this dual approach? Do you anticipate an increase in such administrative tasks, and how do you see them aligning with the armed resistance?**

NPL: It's a given situation. While we are actively engaged in the armed revolution, there is a noticeable shift where we are capturing and holding cities under our control—a shift from the traditional dominance of armed resistance in rural areas. This strategic offensive requires not only resources but also the simultaneous establishment of administration in the captured cities. Maintaining these cities comes with its challenges, especially considering the high cost of resources. For instance, the Spring Development Bank is in the planning stage, and we have also put our efforts into other areas like medical treatment and school openings despite the ongoing conflict. The defensive measures to protect these cities, especially in regions like Sagaing and Magwe, are intensive because the regime seems to target the NUG's controlled areas more aggressively. As we progress, it's essential to demonstrate effective governance to the international community, showing our ability to manage cities successfully. However, this balancing act involves risks as there are concerns about potential security breaches of individuals and administrative members in the process.

**MM: The usage of technology has also featured brilliantly in guerilla attacks using drones etc. However, the junta still has an upper hand in modern warfare with Russian-backed weapons and Chinese spyware. Do you have concerns about the potential arsenals at the generals' disposal, or do you believe the airstrikes are**

**their final resort?**

NPL: The military might possess powerful weapons and use their greatest strength. There are also reports suggesting the potential use of chemical bombs despite the lack of on-site inspection for verification. Still, our reliance on public support remains crucial. Regardless of sophisticated military equipment or weapon costs, sustaining a war requires people's backing. Our young people, empowered by technology, contribute significantly. Although we've developed weapons from scratch, procurement requires a practical approach. And acquiring weapons is no straightforward task; it's not like buying vegetables. Complexities and challenges arise from procurement including timely delivery and transportation across diverse situations. The junta possesses ammunition and guns, but seeing its troops abandoning their posts day and night, it is evident that the regime is reluctant to use these weapons. On our side, there's a shortage of ammunition and weapons, but eagerness to engage in combat among our comrades is unmistakable. The contrasting spirits between younger PDF fighters, filled with anger at their inability to fight, and the apparent disinterest of junta troops, play a crucial role in determining outcomes.

**MM: What would be the ultimate yet realistic goal for the end of 2024?**

NPL: What we can affirm is the successful capture of cities, accompanied by the establishment of administrative functions. Local orders are being issued in Northern Shan state, and the repeal of laws enacted by the military group has been initiated as observed in Sagaing. With more than 32 cities already under control, our strategic offensive will

persist, expanding our influence into additional areas. At the start of this year, signs of the military's disintegration have surfaced. The soldiers' morale and motivation to fight have long gone as they've come to understand that their purpose is simply to safeguard their masters. In an era of widespread information, even if the regime attempts to isolate its soldiers, families and relatives provide insights. The lack of fighting spirit and purpose diminishes their chance of victory. If this trend persists, the gradual collapse of the military becomes inevitable. The prospect of nationwide freedom remains uncertain, given the unknown variables at play. Politics is like solving equations such as  $2+3+X+Y$  when  $X$  and  $Y$  are unknown. In any case, our relentless work continues to achieve the desired victory, utilizing all available resources.

**MM: Anything to add?**

NPL: We probably discussed the armed resistance mainly. In reality, it's more than that. Our main strength lies in the power of the people, and it's crucial to emphasize that our approach is not limited to a single military operation. We are collaborating across different strategies to dismantle the terrorist military group, leveraging various methods beyond just military actions.







## The Coup: Three-year-long Nightmare or Blessing in Disguise?

Just like any other country, Myanmar welcomed the new year 2024. Unlike other countries, the atmosphere in Myanmar is filled with hope as the pro-democracy public channels motivation and inspiration from Operation 1027, the military operation launched by ethnic armed groups in late 2024 which seems to be succeeding. While people celebrated the triumph of ethnic fighters, in alliance with other resistance forces, the military junta simply ignored the defeat that its army faced in Northern Shan State, probably hoping active skirmishes would eventually die down when China stepped in diplomatically.

However, 2024 began with a slap

in the face for the military since the entire Regional Operation Command (Laukkai) which is one of the strongest commands in Myanmar military and stations in Northern Shan State, surrendered to Kokang's Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) which is one of the members of Three Brotherhood Alliance in the first week of January. The surrender was led by six brigadier generals and included almost 4,000 personnel, thousands of heavy weaponry, and ammunition. One significant point to note here is the involvement of the United Wa State Army (UWSA) which initially distanced itself from Myanmar's politics after the coup. UWSA raised

its flag in the middle of Hopang town after the successful siege by the Three Brotherhood Alliance. While the military regime's spokesperson General Zaw Min Tun admitted that Laukkai fell, a UWSA liaison officer also publicly declared that they had controlled Hopang.

The majority of Myanmar citizens were overjoyed with these news stories, and military analysts took an easy guess that conflicts would be intensified in the new year. Still, not everyone celebrates this shift in power because higher officials and businessmen from Lashio, the capital of Eastern Shan State, have prepared to flee as they worry that they will

be the next hotspot after the fall of Northern Shan State to ethnic and resistance forces.

### **Are cities actually safe havens?**

War only means people will suffer. Not just for humans, it is a basic instinct that all living things on earth flee to a safer place when their habitats face danger. Internally displaced people from conflict zones take refuge in bigger cities that they think are still peaceful. Questions remain for these bigger cities too. Are cities actually safe to live in? What kind of threats awaits city dwellers? How can they remain resilient when conflicts seep into their cities?

Cities from central Myanmar are still considered livable for all classes compared to the conflict zones. Clubs and bars are full houses regardless of age and class, and this may give the illusion that cities are safe. Still, they are not entirely safe although they are not as life-threatening as conflict zones. The bigger question is if big cities can promise the safety of those who come to take refuge. We will further discuss some major threats that Myanmar cities face.

### **Min Aung Hlaing's army**

The number one threat for all residents of Myanmar is the military itself. Although the army is losing the fight against the resistance fighters in ethnic areas, the regime troops in cities continue to terrorize the defenseless populace by holding them at gunpoint. To this day, the regime continues to abduct people including youths if they find them suspicious, and then torture them in interrogation centers.

Some families have the means to bribe the military for the release of their sons and daughters with

tens of thousands of Myanmar kyats but those without these means end up behind bars for the long term, and in some cases, some lose their lives. It has become a routine for the military to scheme with regime-appointed ward administrators, conduct surprise checks at civilian houses in designated wards, and then extort money from them. Even in broad daylight, the regime soldiers can be seen working together with traffic police, stopping cars on the road and asking for bribe money with the reason of "road safety". While the military council states in the media allocation of "security personnel" in cities, these soldiers are simply roaming around like mobs and terrorizing civilians.

### **Lack of job opportunities**

The trust built between the then-civilian government and foreign investors from 2011 to 2021 collapsed when Min Aung Hlaing staged the coup on 1st February 2021. As a result, several foreign investors phased out and eventually terminated their projects which consequently adversely affected the job market. Young people are robbed of job opportunities and career development. On the other hand, local businesses were gearing up to resume their work in the new normal in 2021 after struggling in the first year of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 but unfortunately, the military coup only prolonged their struggle due to the mismanagement and illogical policies by the military council. As a result, thousands of employees across the country have been laid off and many struggle to find new jobs.

As an alternative, young and able people find better jobs abroad. Employment agencies for Thai-

land, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea and Japan are busier than ever, and service fees for those agencies are skyrocketing as well.

### **Threat of mobsters**

The intention of internally displaced people is simple. They would move to cities that promise safety and provide job opportunities for their livelihood moving forward. It is visible that IDPs are slowly moving to cities, but they are not the only group that seeps into society. Since its power grab, the military council has released over 30,000 prisoners intending to reduce international and internal pressure on it, and only a handful of them are political prisoners while the majority are criminals. Surely, these individuals head to urban areas in different states and regions only to face a difficult life with limited job opportunities and an increasing cost of living. This situation pushes them to resort to criminal activities. News reports have proven that the crime rate is rising with no rule of law.

### **Policing mechanism**

Myanmar Police Force (MPF) has always been considered a subordinate institute for the military. To make this situation worse, the military losing a large number of its troops in the battlefronts around the country demands the police force to act as a secondary attack force against resistance forces, and eventually tarnishes the role and mechanism of the police force. With such demand, Myanmar Police Force is put in a position where it fails to perform its primary objective which is to enforce the rule of law in the country. Rather than keeping citizens' lives safe, the police force has to cooperate in cracking down on anti-coup protesters and oppressing dissidents while generating their



income by extorting from the people. Even though crime rates have increased in the urban areas, bandits are still at large. Victims also no longer bother to file complaints as they lose faith in the policing system which will only cost them money and time if they get extorted. This is a sign that the policing mechanism is no longer effective in the country.

### **Shortage of goods, basic medicines, and increasing commodities prices**

Myanmar citizens used to claim that contentment was a virtue as they tried to survive under the iron fist of military rule. When the country opened its doors to the world from 2011 to 2021, these people were introduced to good and quality commodities and hospitality services, and they seemed to enjoy these new experiences. With new imports from Western countries coming in, Myanmar citizens who were mostly familiar with products from the region, especially from China, started to use international brands. Unfortunately, since the military staged the coup, these brands gradually pulled out their businesses from Myanmar due to new restrictions made by the military council. As a result, people experience a shortage of imported goods, commodities, and medicines, and consequently, the prices of whatever items that still flow into the country by any means increase.

This impacts the entire country, but those in big cities with decent money suffer the most. From branded items that are worth thousands of dollars to cheap coffee sachets, most items are out of stock in the supermarket as the import trade is affected by the regime's red tape. Even the rich people who used to be able to purchase the newest iPhones

in the same month of release from the comfort of their own homes in Yangon or Mandalay can no longer afford this luxury. Similarly, imported ready-made milk bottles are most of the time out of stock in every supermarket, but when they are on shelves the next time, the prices hike at least 3 to 4 times than the last time they hit the shelves. People with money complain, "It doesn't matter if the price goes up. It sucks that products are not available when we need them." Well, those who do not have that kind of money have no choice but to rely on local made products or low-quality products from China.

### **Fuel shortage and power outage**

Electricity blackouts are not something new for those who were born between 1985 to 1995. They are used to it. People in bigger cities had experienced a taste of having 24-hour electricity during the decade of transition, and they enjoyed it so much. Unfortunately, the country resorted back to the dark when the military regime decided to distribute power with the quota system. Due to the urban lifestyle, cities like Yangon and Mandalay need regular power, but these cities will suffer the worst electricity blackout this summer. To escape these blackouts, diesel engine generators are the go-to substitutes for blackouts. However, buildings in Yangon are not designed to house one generator per apartment, and there is only limited space for big diesel generators on the street as the city planning is not designed to accommodate them.

Yangon is not a city that is famous for its urban planning. While construction companies were permitted to build several highrise buildings to accommo-

date the growing city dwellers, the water supply system was not planned very well. Those who live on the upper floors use motors to generate water for their rooms so the water supply in turn relies on electricity. If a power outage gets too extreme, water shortage will be followed promptly. So far, the power outage is not too terrible and there are still some places for big generators on the streets. But the catch is that these generators are run on fuel. Since the military staged the coup, people experienced a shortage of fuel every now and then as they were imported items. However, it reached the worst situation in 2023 because junta-run Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) was sanctioned by the US and the crisis of foreign currency exchange rate persisted. No sign shows that things will get better for the oil and gas industry in 2024.

### **Growing addictive drug problem**

After the coup, a new wave of the nightlife industry emerged such as live bands, karaoke bars, and overnight clubs. Many people believe that these hubs serve as distractions so that the public will stop supporting the pro-democracy movement. What is worse is that these places are homes for narcotics such as ecstasy and ketamine which are widely known as "party drugs". One does not need to show ID or anything to buy these drugs. Users can simply say "Let's go and get high" out loud in public with no consequences as if it means "Let's go get some beer". Nightclubs, karaoke bars, and pubs are now attracting customers to use drugs. Special trays which contain drugs are ready to be served to customers. There is no way that so-called security forces do not know about the surge of

drugs, but rumor has it that military generals are involved in this drug business.

### **Discrimination against those from conflict area**

News reports have been made that people who hold National ID cards from ethnic regions or resistant stronghold areas face discrimination such as having difficulties in finding jobs or accommodations. The General Administration Department, currently led by the regime, has a strict policy to check newcomers to each neighborhood as the regime feared resistance fighters seeping into the cities. Consequently, landlords and business owners avoid renting their properties to or hiring people who come from resistance stronghold regions. Even if internally displaced people who have nowhere but to take ref-

uge in cities manage to support themselves, the regime-appointed ward administrators keep an eye out for them, and occasionally extort money from them.

### **Guerrilla attacks**

With the regime's significant loss in ethnic regions, urban guerilla attacks resurfaced again. Guerilla groups have warned the public to stay away from soldiers and to avoid moving around the regime's infrastructures and businesses that hold affiliations with the regime. However, the cities are mostly packed in terms of housing and buildings, and the military takes this as its advantage and takes cover among civilians' properties. When the number of urban guerilla attacks, collateral damage is inevitable. This remains one of the most imminent threats for those who live


in or come to take refuge in cities.

To conclude, the military regime is well aware of the threats that urban areas face as discussed above, but it seems that they are intentionally ignoring them. Probably, Min Aung Hlaing and his gang still think they can overcome the current dissent from the people. Seeing how they let the people suffer, one can only wonder if the regime is greatly benefiting from the people's suffering.

It feels right to say this armed resistance is the ultimate battle to take down the military institution once and for all from the Myanmar political realm. But honestly, it has been a three-year-long nightmare and only time will tell if the entire thing has been a blessing in disguise after all.

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## *“Junta’s Jenga”*





## The Unfolding Exodus: Myanmar's Youth Seek New Beginnings in Japan

In the wake of the coup, a wave of young people is abandoning their homeland to pursue a more secure and promising future. The exodus, driven by socio-political turmoil and economic challenges, has become a poignant narrative for thousands of parents witnessing their children embark on a journey to an uncertain destiny.

A father laments, "Everyone is leaving. No more young people left in Myanmar." His own daughter, like countless others, is preparing to relocate to Japan. The stories of families being separated by borders have become tragically commonplace in post-coup Myanmar.

According to Gallup's interviews

conducted within seven months after the coup in 2021, there has been a staggering increase in the number of Myanmar citizens expressing a desire to leave their country. The percentage surged from a mere 6% in 2018 to a record 24% in late 2021. Japan, known for its stable employment opportunities amid a declining native workforce, has seen a threefold rise in the influx of Myanmar workers, with 105 local agencies dispatching an additional 9,627 individuals for low-skilled manual jobs between late 2020 and early 2021.

The Mainichi, Japanese daily news, reported in October 2022 that the total number of Myanmar workers in Japan rose from

27,798 to 47,498, representing a significant shift post-COVID and post-coup Myanmar.

Ei, a young mother in her early thirties from Yangon, epitomizes the determination of these migrants. Formerly a mathematics teacher who used English as a medium in her job, she decided to switch careers after the coup. Learning Japanese became her ticket to overseas employment, driven by a desire to secure a better future for her children. Despite facing communication challenges in her new language and the heart-wrenching prospect of leaving her family behind, Ei remains resolute in her decision to work as a caregiver trainee in Japanese nursing homes.




The increasing demand for Japanese language proficiency is evident in the rising number of language courses offered both online and in face-to-face classes. The desperation of young people is palpable, as witnessed on 5 August 2022, when a large crowd anxiously sought Japanese Language Proficiency Test (JLPT) level four (N4) forms. A prerequisite for working in Japan, obtaining at least an N4 certification has become a strand of hope for these aspirants. Reports indicate that thousands, ranging from 5,000 to 10,000 individuals, queued for hours, some even waiting since

the early hours of the morning, to secure their test forms—a tangible ticket to their envisioned futures.

Among them is 20-year-old Kay, the eldest in her family, who sacrificed her university education to support her struggling family in Myanmar. Hailing from a farming background, Kay decided to become a caregiver trainee in Japan after achieving JLPT N4 certification. Despite the temporary hiatus in her education, she remains steadfast in her commitment to send money back home and, with unwavering hope,

dreams of pursuing a university education in Japan in the future.

While Japan has become one of the most popular countries that Myanmar youths consider migrating to, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and other countries farther away are also proper contenders for such moves as the homeland is no longer a place where the young generation can thrive. The stories of these young individuals mirror the resilience and aspirations of a generation seeking solace and opportunity beyond the confines of their homeland.



# Highlights of the Armed Resistance

The armed resistance witnessed a significant downfall of the regime in various forms. Notably, the impact on the regime's aerial assets is evident in three major areas:

## **The Downfall of the Regime's Aerial Assets:**

In the span of three months, the regime faced four instances where military helicopters were either shot down or crashed due to engine faults. Three of these incidents occurred in January alone. As the junta's forces lost ground on multiple fronts, their air force became a last resort. The news of these crashes served as a crucial morale boost for the resistance forces and the people of Myanmar.

- **KIA shot down regime's helicopter in Winemaw tsp, Kachin state**

The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) successfully downed a Russian-made Mi-17 military helicopter in Winemaw township, Kachin state on January 3. The incident resulted in the deaths of six individuals aboard the aircraft while a major named Zaw Myo Thant was captured alive by the KIA. This marked the second instance of the regime's aerial asset being brought down, resulting in the detention of its official following a similar incident in Karenni state in November.

- **KIA shot down fighter jet in Kutkai tsp, Shan state (North)**

In the ongoing battle in Namphatka village, Kut Kai township, Northern Shan state, KIA forces successfully shot down a regime jet fighter on January 16. The area

had witnessed intense fighting between the Light Infantry Division 123 of the regime and the KIA and alliances since the final week of December. Two regime airmen on board were killed.

- **KNU and alliances shot down another fighter jet**

At least five regime officers, including a brigadier general, were killed in a helicopter crash in Myawaddy Township, Karen State on January 29. The Karen National Union (KNU), the political wing of the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), claimed responsibility for shooting down the helicopter. Brig-Gen Aye Min Naung, serving as the newly assigned commander for the Myanmar army's Light Infantry Division 44, was among the deceased. The KNU reported three majors and a captain killed in the crash, with another officer injured. The Cobra Column, an ally of the KNLA, also claimed responsibility for downing the aircraft and released video footage of the Eurocopter being fired on with heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades.

## **Seizure of Cities and Surrenders:**

The armed resistance has also achieved substantial territorial control, marking a notable shift from the regime's dominance until late October 2023. Operation 1027 has played a pivotal role, resulting in the capture of 39 cities/towns by either Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs) or NUG-governed forces. Here are some highlighted cases:

- **Laukkai Regional Command**

## **surrendered**

Six brigadier generals and thousands of troops from Laukkai Regional Operations Command Center surrendered as Kokang's MNDA forces entered the base on January 4. Negotiations took place before the surrender, and the surrendered individuals and their families were transported to Lashio. The Three Brotherhood Alliance announced the liberation of Kokang, signaling a significant development in the region.

- **The regime's Forces surrendered Kutkai Town to PSLF/TNLA in Shan-North**

The regime's forces surrendered Kutkai Town in Shan-north to the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), part of the Three Brotherhood Alliances and the armed wing of the Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF) on January 7. The town was captured after an eight-day mission initiated by TNLA and its alliances, leading to the relocation of the regime's army and their families to Lashio.

- **AA captured Pauktaw Town, Rakhine state**

Pauktaw, near Sittwe, was reportedly captured by the Arakan Army (AA) on January 19. The conflict originated from an AA attack on a police station in November 2023. By January 19, regime soldiers were evacuated, with the AA capturing ten junta soldiers alive. The AA was reportedly clearing the area to allow back in the residents who had been fleeing conflicts for over two months.

- **Resistance forces captured the first regime station in Tanintharyi region**

Allied forces, led by the KNU and

the PDF, successfully captured the regime's Kyaukhtu outpost in Dawei Township, Tanintharyi Region on January 24. Eight junta soldiers were captured, and fifteen were killed with two wounded. This outpost, held by the regime since 1998, now becomes the first military station occupied by the resistance forces in the Tanintharyi Region.

- **KNDF captured Mawchi town, Karenni state**

The Karenni National Defense Force (KNDF) announced the successful capture of Mawchi town in Karenni (Kayah) state on January 28. The regime troops withdrew without fighting, and KNDF forces now claim full control over the entire Mawchi area after attacking and capturing key junta camps.

**Regime's commanders captured:**

The armed resistance has not only achieved territorial gains but also notable successes in capturing high-ranking regime officials. Several of these commanders were interviewed, and video clips of these interactions were shared with the public. The impact of these encounters is not only encouraging in terms of showcasing the officials' remorse but also holds the potential to influence those under their command. The following incidents highlight these achievements:

- **NUG's forces captured the regime's lieutenant colonel**

The NUG issued a statement accompanied by images showcasing the seizure of a regime station in Naungcho township, Shan-north. The capture that took place on January 2 following a day-long battle, resulted in casualties on both sides. Notably, the junta's lieutenant colonel

Thet Aung was taken alive during the confrontation. Colonel Thet Aung is the highest-ranking regime official captured by NUG-affiliated forces.


- **TNLA released a video of the captured regime's brigadier general**

On January 10, the TNLA released a video featuring Brigadier General Min Min Tun, a high-ranking prisoner of war captured during Operation 1027. The former commander of Light Infantry Division 101 expressed remorse over civilian casualties and destruction caused by heavy weapons and airstrikes under his command. While he claimed no intentional targeting of civilians, he admitted responsibility and apologized to the people of Ta'ang. The video also conveyed his appeal to regime leaders to cease war crimes, and he reassured his family that TNLA was treating him well.





# People's Resistance War in Dec/Jan



**129**  
CASUALTIES FROM RESISTANCE FORCES

**2751**  
CASUALTIES FROM SAC

**1191**  
REGIME SOLDIERS SURRENDERED

**Forces**  
■ PDF  
■ SAC

**Number of Skirmishes**  
 9 ————— 265

**Casualties**  
 • 1  
 ● 50  
 ● 100  
 ● 150  
 ● 212

**★ Controlled towns by resistance forces**

State/Region	# of towns
Shan	21
Chin	8
Kachin	1
Sagaing	4
Karenni	4
Rakhine	1

Sources: Khit Thit Media, NUG


# Crimes Against Humanity

9

different locations witnessed the regime's crimes against humanity in December and January

## Political prisoners faced untimely deaths due to lack of medical treatment

A total of five political prisoners tragically lost their lives in December and January across various prisons in Myanmar. Ma Cherry Win, a 23-year-old detainee in Insein Prison, passed away upon her late arrival at a hospital on December 21. Similarly, in Ayeyarwaddy Region, 30-year-old Ko San Lin San perished in Patheingyi Prison on December 30 after authorities denied his request for medical treatment for a head ailment. Additionally, two political prisoners lost their lives within a week in Kyaikmaraw Prison, Mon State, due to inadequate medical care. On January 12, 43-year-old Ko Rashin @ Hashin succumbed to insufficient medical treatment, while on January 16, 31-year-old Ko Pyae Phyo Aung, a CDM firefighter, passed away shortly after receiving a shot for stomach pain from the prison doctor. Furthermore, 22-year-old political prisoner Ma Su May Aung, a former chemistry honors student detained in Magway Prison, died on January 22 due to inadequate medication. Unfortunately, the families of the victims were compelled to remain silent about these distressing incidents.



## NUG-controlled towns bombed, resulted in civilian casualties

The regime's retaliation towards the NUG and resistance forces resulted in many civilian casualties. The junta's forces reportedly attacked two towns in Sagaing Region under the control of the NUG in the first week of January, with the first one targeting Kawlin and the second Khampat. On January 2, forces stationed in Wundwin Town fired at least six artillery rounds, targeting Kawlin East Market, claiming the lives of six individuals and injuring two others. The killed victims were Daw Moe Moe Win, aged 55, Daw San San Win, aged 46, Daw Aye Hnin, aged 41, and two unidentified women, aged 17 and 40 respectively. On January 7, two separate aerial assaults occurred in Ka Nan Village, Khampat Town—one on the village school and another on a residential ward. These strikes resulted in the tragic deaths of at least ten civilians, leaving over twenty individuals injured.

- Regime's massacre on December 2 saw 11 people burned alive in Kyapaing Village, Monywa township, Sagaing Region
- Regime bombed the NUG court in Mintaingpin Village, Pale township, Sagaing Region on January 2, six people including the judge were killed
- Five hostages tortured and killed, one subject to gang-rape in Mae Oh Village, Depayin township, Sagaing Region

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