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FROM THE EDITOR

Folks, so much had happened since we last reported. In late July, Min Aung Hlaing dissolved the State Administration Council (SAC) after four years and rebranded it as the National Security and Peace Commission, which is designated as an interim government until the election. Despite the rebrand, he remains a self-declared president. On August 1, the military regime also announced the revocation of the nationwide state of emergency declared since February 1, 2021. However, 63 out of 330 townships are placed in an emergency state due to instability. Furthermore, the regime announced an amendment to the Protection of Personal Privacy and Personal Security of Citizens Law on the same day, which stripped away the protection of citizens from arbitrary arrest and detention, stalking, intercepting communications, destroying, and confiscating private properties.

The election was a hot topic as the regime-assembled Union Election Commission announced that three rounds of elections would take place: the first one on December 28, the second in January 2026, and the third is TBA. However, elections would not be held in 56 townships as they were under the control of resistance forces. The UEC also said that it would use the mixed-member proportion electoral system. Even politicians and political parties struggled to understand the new electoral system that the junta introduced, let alone the voters. In late July, the regime enacted the Law on the Protection of Elections from Disruption and Sabotage, which allowed imposing a three-year imprisonment to the death penalty for obstructing elections.

Despite the challenges, junta-leaning political parties, such as the People's Party and the People's Pioneer Party, as well as other regional parties, sought registration to contest the election. Ethnic armed groups such as TNLA and KNU had declared to boycott the election and urged the public to object to it in non-violent ways. The rights group also urged regional leaders to reject the junta-organized election. The parallel government, NUG, stated that if individuals residing in its territories pressured the public to vote in the illegal election, they would face legal

action. However, there are limited choices for civilians living in the military-controlled territories: they will either be forced to go and vote, or their votes will be taken as the regime's votes.

On September 27, the National League for Democracy (NLD) celebrated its 37th year of formation. Although the military regime dissolved the party, it declared that the party would continue to exist for the people in a statement. It also reiterated the importance of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's participation in any dialogue to resolve Myanmar's issues. Meanwhile, the ousted leader's whereabouts and conditions remain unclear. In early September, it was reported that the Lady was denied access to see a cardiologist.

In other news, the regime's puppet president, U Myint Swe, the former vice president and military man, passed away on August 7, 2025, at a military hospital. He was responsible for several ruthless military operations and crackdowns during his time in the military. Not many offered condolences.

In July, US President Trump addressed Min Aung Hlaing, informing the head of state of the announcement of a 40% tariff on Myanmar exports to the US. This letter seemed to give the junta chief a dose of legitimacy to consolidate his self-proclaimed titles. The coup leader then responded to President Trump, praising him and pleading to ease the sanctions. A few weeks later, the US Treasury Department lifted sanctions on several junta-linked businesses and individuals, including KT Services & Logistics. Meanwhile, the US announced a funding cut on humanitarian aid to refugees on the Thai-Myanmar border in August, which would affect over 80,000 people.

On the ASEAN front, the 10-nation bloc urged the regime to prioritize peace over the election in July. Again, in early August, ASEAN led a meeting in Kuala Lumpur to address the situation in Myanmar by inviting stakeholders of the revolution, such as the NUG and other ethnic armed organizations. On the other hand, the Inter-Parliamentary Union continued to recognize the Committee Representing Pyihtaungsu

Hluttaw (CRPH) as the representatives of Myanmar and its key partner.

Across the country, airstrikes continue to terrorize the civilians. In September, the regime's fighter jets carried out an airstrike on two private schools in Kyauk-taw Township, Rakhine State, and killed at least 18 people, including young students. The regime's paragliders dropped bombs on a village during the Thadingyut lighting festival in Chaung-U township in October, killing at least 20 people, including children. Despite the public outcry and international sanctions, the military continues to use airstrikes to crack down on the people with no remorse.

Late August marked eight years since the clearance operation that caused a mass exodus of Rohingya Muslims from Rakhine State. To this day, about 750,000 Rohingyas are taking refuge in Bangladesh. High-level discussions were organized to find a solution for repatriation, but a safe return to their homes would not be possible unless the ongoing conflict ends in the region.

The junta chief held an extravaganza in Nay Pyi Taw to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement

(NCA), which was signed on October 15, 2015. Representatives of ethnic armed groups, political parties, and other actors that remain in good relations with the regime were in attendance. In his speech, Min Aung Hlaing urged political stakeholders to partake in parliamentary politics instead of armed resistance. Preparing for the election, the military regime attempts to reclaim a few territories that it had previously lost to resistance forces. Notably, in northern Shan state, the regime reclaimed Kyaukme and Hsipaw, which were controlled by TNLA after Operation 1027. In late October, TNLA agreed to retreat from Mogok and Momeik towns and signed a ceasefire agreement with the regime as the deal was brokered by China.

In the coming months, Myanmar people will face yet another dilemma: between their personal safety and their commitment to the revolution, between the comfortable present and the hope for a better nation in the long run. Some have made it clear that they will boycott the election. Five years after the coup and the regime's multiple attempts at rebranding, the people are still committed to showing where they stand. It is the duty of those in power -from the NUG to leaders of great nations- to recognize the people's sentiment and to protect them as they defy the brutal yet devious military leadership.



Mohinga Matters is an exile media platform that provides space for young people from Myanmar to share stories about politics, everyday life, and resistance following the military coup. We document key events, collect stories from all walks of life, and publish them on our website:

<https://mohingamatters.com>

October 1, 2025

At least four garment factories in Yangon's Shwe Pyi Thar and Hlaing Tharyar townships have closed since the US imposed a 40% tariff on Myanmar's exports on August 1. Some factories have cut workers and suspended overtime since the tariffs took effect.

The regime announced that it is providing military training to university training staff and students, stating that participation is voluntary.

The Thai government has begun implementing a program allowing refugees living in displacement camps on the Myanmar border to work outside the territory.

The regime has regained control of Kyaukme, a district-level town on the Myanmar-China trade route in northern Shan State, previously captured by the TNLA in August 2024.

October 7, 2025

Between October 2 and 7, airstrikes on Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)-controlled towns: Hsipaw, Namtu, and Namsan in northern Shan State reportedly killed eight people, including two children, and injured around 20.

October 8, 2025

Daw Thet Thet Khaing, chairwoman of the People's Pioneer Party, stated that detained leaders President U Win Myint and State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi are not political prisoners but were imprisoned for corruption.

Three students and a disabled woman were killed, and over 20 injured, when airstrikes hit two schools in Mindat Township, southern Chin State.

October 2, 2025

The "Building the New Myanmar: Democracy, Justice, and Peace for the People of Myanmar" discussion was held at the UN Church Center in New York, attended by Ambassador U Kyaw Moe Htun, NUG Foreign Minister Daw Zin Mar Aung and other NUG officials.

A UNDP report states that Myanmar's youth—more than a third of the population—face unprecedented learning challenges and worsening education and income opportunities due to political instability and economic decline.

October 6, 2025

At least 20 people, including children, civilians, and resistance fighters, were killed and at least 40 injured when a motorized parachute bomb was dropped during a lighting festival on the full moon of Thadingyut in Chaung U Township, Sagaing Region.

Telenor faces a lawsuit in Norway for allegedly handing over sensitive user data to the Myanmar military, potentially enabling human rights abuses after the coup. The case is supported by the Center for Research on Multi-national Corporations (SOMO) and the Open Society Justice Initiative (OSJI).

October 9, 2025

During a visit to Myanmar, Malaysia's Foreign Minister met the junta leader to discuss ASEAN's Five-point consensus. ASEAN clarified it did not agree to cooperate with or observe the junta's planned elections.

Thirteen people, including 7 children, were killed and 16 injured in military airstrikes on Moe Myit Township (northern Shan) and Bilin Township (Mon State).

October 10, 2025

The British and Australian embassies condemned the military's bombing of civilians in Chaung U Township, Sagaing Region, calling it unacceptable.

October 13, 2025

Six ethnic armed groups (KNU, ABSDF, CNF, NMSP-AD, PNLO, and LDU) jointly urged the UN, ASEAN, and diplomats not to attend the junta's 10th anniversary ceremony for the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA).

October 14, 2025

The Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M) declared that the junta is preparing a sham election and said this is ASEAN's last chance to act after over four years of military rule.

At the 29th Forum 2000 Conference in Prague, participants called for global pressure to secure the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and all political prisoners in Myanmar.

October 16, 2025

The Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) stated that the military's control of the country has halted the peace process.

The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) is planning to allow new mining permits more than a year after it seized control of the Chipwe and Panwa regions, home to billions of dollars worth of mineral deposits on the northern border with China.

The military has regained control of Hsipaw, a district-level town on the Myanmar-China trade route in northern Shan State. The TNLA captured Thibaw on October 13, 2024

October 19, 2025

The regime's military raided and arrested members of "KK Park," a group operating money-laundering and online scam businesses near Lay Kay Kaw, Kayin State.

October 11, 2025

Resistance groups called on ASEAN to reject the junta's planned elections and to demand the release of political prisoners, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.

The Malaysian Parliamentary Special Select Committee (PSSC) on International Relations called for clarification over reports suggesting Malaysia supported the junta's election plans, saying this could be misinterpreted as ASEAN endorsement.

October 15, 2025

At the 10th anniversary of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in Nay Pyi Taw, Min Aung Hlaing said that since some points have been agreed upon to amend the 2008 Constitution, ethnic groups and relevant individuals should ask for only the possible and not the impossible.

The Chinese government's special representative for Asian affairs said during a speech at the NCA ceremony that China is ready to provide assistance for the upcoming elections.

The Myanmar Bar Council (BLC) announced that the military coup's upcoming elections in December are not in line with any law enacted in Myanmar, including the 2008 Constitution.

The Union Election Commission announced that rallies and campaigns will be allowed for 60 days for the first round of the military coup election, which will begin on December 28.

A spokesperson for the United Wa State Army (UWSA) said it will support the upcoming election by the regime, responding to media inquiries at the NCA anniversary.

October 20, 2025

The military council continued to bomb at least six townships in northern Shan State controlled by the TNLA, resulting in 42 civilian deaths in October.

STUM leader Daw Myo Myo Aye, along with imprisoned labor activists Ko Thet Hnin Aung and Ma Thet Thaw Swe, were released after all charges against them were dropped by the military council.

October 23, 2025

The military commission will implement a “non-voting system” for its civilian employees in the upcoming December elections, according to staff in Nay Pyi Taw.

The 151st Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) Executive Council meeting in Geneva decided to continue recognizing the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) as a key dialogue partner.

Over 2,500 Starlink devices suspected of being used by money-laundering gangs in Myanmar have reportedly been shut down.

Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim confirmed that Myanmar’s military leaders will not attend the upcoming ASEAN Summit in Malaysia.

Mae Sot officials estimated that around 1,000 members of the tycoon gang fled to Mae Sot, Thailand, after the junta raided a money-laundering operation in the KK Park compound in Myawaddy Township, Karen State.

October 25, 2025

The military-backed Union Election Commission removed 86 candidates, including People’s Pioneer Party (PPP) chairwoman Daw Thet Thet Khaing, for violating parliamentary election regulations.

On the 65th anniversary of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), KIO/KIA Chairman General Nban La expressed concern that the junta’s December election could prolong the ongoing civil war.

October 21, 2025

Eight people, including children, were killed and more than 20 injured when the military bombed Mogok and Thabeikkyin towns in Mandalay Region.

October 22, 2025

The military bombed five townships in Kachin State in a single day: Khaung Lan Phu, Sok Lau, Bhamo, Waing Maw, and Hpakant.

October 24, 2025

South Korea’s Ministry of Justice announced that it will tighten scrutiny of special residence visa (G1-99) applications from Burmese workers, citing employers’ complaints about workers leaving their original jobs after obtaining asylum visas.

Malaysian Foreign Minister Mohamed Hassan said it is not difficult to implement ASEAN’s common agreement for peace in Myanmar and urged the military council to comply and allow humanitarian aid distribution.

Thai media reported that preparations are underway to extradite Shi Zhijiang, a key leader in online fraud operations and founder of Shwe Kokko, to Chinese authorities.

Justice For Myanmar (JFM) issued a statement ahead of the 47th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, urging ASEAN to oppose the junta’s illegal election attempt to gain political legitimacy.

October 29, 2025

The Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) announced that it had reached a ceasefire agreement with the military council during talks held in Kunming, China, on October 27–28 at the invitation of the Chinese government. The agreement includes the withdrawal of Ta’ang forces from Mogok and Moeik Townships, a halt to military airstrikes and attacks in the Ta’ang region, and a mutual ceasefire by both sides.



STANDING AGAINST GENOCIDE... CONDITIONALLY

In the international news, Myanmar's gravest tragedy of the last two decades has not been the 2021 coup, but the Rohingya genocide that unfolded during the democratic transition from 2010 to 2021. Allegations of mass killings and ethnic cleansing began in 2012 and escalated into what international courts now investigate as genocide in 2016–2017. Both the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) are examining these crimes.

Inside Myanmar, however, the genocide was met with denial or indifference. While few would condone mass killings, the indifference came from receiving a radically different version of events from what the world saw. Back then, Burmese-language media rarely used the term Rohingya, referring instead to “Bengali,” “illegal immigrants” or “boat people”. Most mainstream media portrayed the military (Tatmadaw) as protectors of ethnic Rakhine Buddhists from “Bengali terrorists,” while UN reports and global outlets described the opposite — the military and Rakhine mobs as aggressors. Moreover, the role of Facebook in amplifying hate speech and disinformation has been well-documented,

even [acknowledged by Meta itself](#). In this distorted information environment, sympathy for the Rohingya was nearly absent.

From Denial to Sympathy — and to Selective Outrage

The 2021 military coup changed that dynamic. As the junta unleashed violence across the country, many people began to draw painful parallels between their own suffering and that of the Rohingya. For the first time, [Myanmar public showed remorse for having ignored or denied the Rohingya's plight](#).

Yet for the Rohingyas themselves, life did not improve. Caught between the Tatmadaw and the Arakan Army (AA) — both openly hostile to them — they remained trapped between a rock and a hard place. In the first few years of the coup, Rakhine State saw relative calm, due to the ceasefire between AA and the junta, while war raged on in other parts of the country. That ended in late 2023, when the AA launched major offensives. Within two years, the AA seized most of Rakhine State, leaving the junta in control of only two towns. To the Rakhine people, this is a testament to their bravery and dedica-

tion. To many in the revolutionary movement, these gains symbolized the success of Myanmar's Spring Revolution and the prospect of a federal democratic future.

But for the Rohingya, the AA's rise has been disastrous.

New Atrocities, Familiar Silence

Over the past two years, [credible witness accounts have accused the AA of mass killings](#), burning of Rohingya settlements including a major town, forced displacement and many other atrocities against Rohingya civilians. [UN](#), [Amnesty International](#), [Human Rights Watch](#), [Fortify Rights](#) and many others have all documented abuses by the Arakan Army, alongside those of junta's forces. Some Rohingya rights organizations now [call for ICC investigations into AA leadership](#), in a similar manner towards the junta and former civilian leaders.

Yet in Myanmar political landscape, to offend the sainted EROs (ethnic revolutionary organizations), particularly the one as prominent as AA, is taboo. Burmese-language media that routinely cover junta atrocities or People's Defense Force (PDF) misconduct largely avoid reporting AA abuses. When they do, AA denials often receive more coverage than the allegations themselves. Many outlets simply republish AA press statements, sidelining Rohingya voices and witness accounts.

This selective reporting echoes the moral blindness of the 2010s. Then, most Burmese-language media ignored the Rohingya genocide; today, near total pro-revolutionary national media houses (including those spoke up for Rohingya against junta's forces before and now) and ethnic-aligned state media outlets (who have ties or reasons to fear the dominant EROs in each areas, and because these EROs are usually AA allies or have no reasons to cross AA for something that does not matter to them as the Rohingyas) and activists fall silent when the perpetrators are the Arakan Army. The echo chamber that once justified the junta military's actions now shields EROs.

Silence of Those Once Claimed "Silence is Complicity"

This silence is more pronounced than before. During the 2017 genocide, human rights activists dared to speak up. Today, even those voices

When any armed group operates without accountability, and when criticism is filtered through partisanship rather than principle, the space for truth collapses.

are being faded. When a coalition of civil society organizations (CSOs) in May 2024 urged the AA to investigate alleged abuses, several groups — including prominent ones like the General Strike Committee — [quickly retracted from the statement and apologized to the AA](#) after AA's pressure. AA's might has not just allowed success on their own turf but in sponsoring [a network of armed groups across the country](#), and influence over the CSOs and media.

Similarly, activists who once declared standing against genocide during the 2019 ICJ hearings are now conspicuously quiet at a time their voice matter similarly if not more.

All these reflect a deeper problem: that moral principles in Myanmar's political culture remain conditional — applied only when convenient.

The National Unity Government (NUG), which had initially [called for peaceful coexistence in Rakhine](#), also went silent after the AA rebuffed its statement. It is also noteworthy that NUG, despite its lofty aims of being a national government, has no influence over AA, the same goes towards any other EROs. If that is the federalism we are heading, that would be federalism without democratic norms, and we would just be replacing the authoritarian at national level with state level.

Currently, due to the silence of media and activists in highlighting AA's role in human rights violations to the Rohingyas, public empathy has become ridiculously inconsistent. Many who expressed solidarity with Rohingyas since 2021 now show anger at the junta's military's

oppression on them and dismiss or rationalize the suffering at AA's hands at the same time, even if violations of junta's forces and AA are being mentioned in the same report.

The Pattern Repeats

For the Rohingya people, this new phase feels like escaping the frying pan only to land in the fire. Some now openly describe [the AA as worse than the junta](#). Whether or not that judgment is fair, it underscores their despair and isolation. The pattern of unchecked power and intimidation is unmistakable.

When any armed group operates without accountability, and when criticism is filtered through partisanship rather than principle, the space for truth collapses. The result is a new cycle of silence and complicity.

The tragedy facing the Rohingya — and the silence surrounding it — is not accidental. It reflects how narratives, power, and selective outrage shape Myanmar's politics. Each faction, in

turn, justifies its own violence or excuses its allies', framing atrocities as necessary for ethnic liberation or self-defense or federal democracy. This moral selectivity corrodes the very ideals the Spring Revolution claims to fight for. When atrocities are condemned only based on who commits them, justice becomes just another tool of politics.

Toward Consistency

Until principal-based consistency replaces tribal loyalty, Myanmar risks repeating the same horrors under new banners. The Rohingya, Bamar, Rakhine, Chin, Kachin, Karen, and countless others — all remain trapped in a system that rewards silence and punishes moral honesty.

Standing against genocide means standing against it everywhere, no matter who the perpetrators are. Anything less is mere hypocrisy.

Myanmar still needs its heroes.


Last year, we released a comic book honoring those who continue to stand, resist, and hope in the face of dictatorship.

We share it again this month to remind ourselves that their fight, and their courage, continue.

Read and Share:

In English: <https://bit.ly/4iUoaZm>

In Burmese: <https://bit.ly/4fwJj97>



Free nor Fair

*A locked door with false keys
A ladder with no rungs
A bird with trimmed wings pushed off the ledge
A scale that tips to the devil's tongue*


*My neighbor paints his door the color of obedience
Their mother whispers a sound of fear
A man who refused was unmade by the night,
His footprints swept before sunrise*


*Neatly marked names, the quiet lie,
sealed beneath a watching eye
Even the ink seems to flinch,
bruised by the memory of a thief's cold pinch*

*The shadows of the missing cast into the box
The box:
heavy as guilt,
hollow as mercy,
carrying the weight of an unworthy journey*

*Some will row, some will resist,
But no matter the prayer, the whisper, the fist,
The river will choose the exit.*

-Pearl





OMITTED FROM THE GLOBAL GEN-Z PROTEST, MYANMAR'S YOUTH FIGHT ON

From Asia to Africa, headlines are buzzing with news of Gen-Z protesters challenging corrupt, authoritarian governments. Major news outlets have dubbed this wave 'Asia's Gen-Z Rising,' the 'Global Gen-Z Protest,' and even a new 'Asian Spring.' Emphasis has been on the demographic born between the mid-1990s to early 2010s who are known as Generation Z. They highlight the hallmarks of this generation's activism: a mastery of social media, the use of pop-culture symbols for mobilization, and leaderless organizational structures. [Wikipedia](#) is also being updated on the term, Global Gen-Z Protests, listing the countries where Gen-Z protests have occurred as far back as 2022 in Sri Lanka, where they ousted the government.

Some viral posts on social media frame the Gen-Z protests as a domino effect listing Indonesia, Nepal, Philippines, Madagascar, Morocco, and more. Yet, scrolling through these lists, a desperate question appears from Burmese followers: "Where is Myanmar Gen-Z?" While articles in [Le Monde](#) and [NPR](#) have covered Myanmar's 2021 protests in their news about global Gen-Z protests, and [the Indian Express](#) has grouped its use of pop-culture sym-

bols with Thailand and Hong Kong, the specific frame of a 'Gen-Z protest or revolution' about Myanmar is conspicuously absent from most major news outlets. This is the central question this article poses: Why has the global media forgotten Myanmar's Gen-Z protest and revolution that began with the February 2021 coup? With this forgetting, Myanmar's ongoing revolution, a deadly struggle against a totalitarian military regime led by Min Aung Hlaing, is buried underneath.

This omission is not passive; it's a choice. The art of 'forgetting' Myanmar's ongoing revolution or its 'being forgotten' is, in fact, criticized by Edith Mirante entitled, '[Forgotten War in Burma, ignored war in Myanmar](#)' in the New Mandala. She argues that, "Western media outlets' resort to the cliché of Myanmar as a "forgotten" country is not only self-incriminating—it risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy as the resistance fights on without the international support it urgently needs." Written in 2024, she criticized how the international media's use of the word 'forgotten' to describe the situation in Myanmar is self-validating by the fact that the struggle of the Myanmar people's revolution-

ary war against the military regime was largely unreported. Most international outlets have marginal interests in Myanmar compared to Ukraine, the middle east, and Palestine's Gaza dire situations. Myanmar's stories tend to focus on victimhood, and when the bravery and sacrifices of young Myanmar people need remembrance, these stories of active participation, deliberate sacrifices, and agencies are sidelined.

This framing ignores their agency. It overlooks the tech-savvy Myanmar Gen-Z who initially flooded the streets, armed with meme culture, the three-finger salute, and the transnational solidarity of the Milk Tea Alliance following the 2021 military coup. It sidelines the story of young civil servants who crippled the state by joining the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM). And it fails to capture the agonizing choice made by protesters who, faced with live ammunition, torture, and imprisonment, were forced to evolve from peaceful dissent to self-defense with Molotov cocktails, and eventually, for many, to armed revolution in the country's liberated zones. Yo Yo, a 28-year-old CDM nurse who is a frontline nurse working in the Central Health Department of Karenni People Defense Force (KNDF), talked about her experiences as a peaceful protester at the beginning of the Spring Revolution. She said she really thought this would all be over with a peaceful protest and did not expect things to escalate

Myanmar's stories tend to focus on victimhood, and when the bravery and sacrifices of young Myanmar people need remembrance, these stories of active participation, deliberate sacrifices, and agencies are sidelined.

to this armed revolution. She was organizing protests during the day and volunteering as a health care worker at night, but as things started to turn more and more violent, she chose to go to the liberated area in Karenni State. The choice made by Yo Yo is similar to an individual like Maung, a 22-year-old medic from Karen State. Before the coup, he was a Sunday school teacher and theology student aspiring to work for the Church. He initially protested peacefully every day, 'hoping that the right people would come back to rule this country.' That hope was met with brutal force, and his journey reflects the revolution's painful evolution: he is now a medic with the Black Panther Column.

Therefore, to truly understand Myanmar's Gen Z, some researchers have argued that understanding Myanmar's Gen Z revolutionaries requires a new theoretical framework moving from rupture-like qualities and revolutionary events as the fundamental unit of analysis. We cannot view the "revolution" as a single event and conclude it as one; we must continue to engage with the ongoing everyday lived situation of young individuals with agency in Myanmar. We must see it as a daily, grinding reality for a generation—a 'revolutionary situation' where the old order has collapsed, and a new one is being fought for every day.

The [article](#), "Living with the Revolution: The Everyday Experiences of Myanmar's Gen Z Revolutionaries" by Justine Chambers and Saw Ner Dhu Da, brings attention to the everyday lived experiences and conditions of young men and women as they live their revolutionary lives on the frontlines and as urban silenced warriors. Using the anthropological approach with attention to the micro-level revolutionary politics and qualitative narrative analysis, the young revolutionary voices in Karen State are recorded. Their revolutionary reality, their ambitions, hopes, despairs, contradictions, possibilities, and complexities show an immense sacrifice of each individual involved in the Myanmar revolution against the military institution.

Moreover, the authors argued that while initially the Gen-Z protesters' peaceful protests demanded reform, eventually they called for revolutionary ideas of challenging the foundational structure of military dominance as well as outdated ideas and practices of the society. This can be recognized as a 'revolutionary situ-

ation' as argued by Justine Chambers and Nick Cheeseman in the [new mandala](#).

This is precisely why the media's 'forgetting' is so dangerous: it abandons these young revolutionaries in the middle of a marathon, focusing only on those crises that appear as dramatic sprints. That relentless, daily grind is embodied by people like Bunny, a 20-year-old former medical student. Now living and fighting in the jungle with limited resources, he acknowledges the hardship but remains steadfast. "We, Gen Z, have our own free will, make our own decisions, and take responsibility for our own choices," he says. "We never submit to power, and we will not be brainwashed by those in power." His resolve underscores the profound danger of the media's amnesia. To forget this struggle is to abandon Bunny and a generation like him in the middle of their marathon. They are not just fighting for a headline; they are fighting for their future, every single day.

But this unwavering resolve exists alongside a profound and wearying frustration—the direct result of the world's neglect. For Yo Yo, the international silence and lack of action is not an abstraction; it is measured in the dead, the displaced, and a stolen future. She describes a ground reality of "deadly violence, people fleeing homes, being killed and scattered across the jungle, and losing their homes." This is the context for her shock when foreign reporters

arrived, admitting they were there because "nobody knows the situation in Myanmar." She was stunned that the world was unaware "how terrible the situation has been here, taking many innocent lives, how we are losing future and hope in four years."

The emotional toll of this isolation is crystallized in her question: "How much longer should we keep telling the world?" Her conclusion is one of bitter resignation: "I don't feel bothered at all now after all these years... I would have answered differently if you had asked me before about the media attention on Myanmar... But now I don't really think about it anymore."

Yet, even in her refusal to perform her pain for a distant audience, her commitment, like Bunny's, remains unbroken: "We will continue working harder and try to let the world know in our own capacity."

This is the stark, full reality of Myanmar's marathon. It is run with the determination of Bunny and the weary resilience of Yo Yo. The media's 'forgetting' does not make the struggle disappear; it merely forces its heroes to fight on, documenting the deadly violence and scattered lives themselves, feeling increasingly alone. To forget them is not just to ignore a conflict—it is to abandon the very people who, against all odds, are still trying to save their future.



POWER TO THE PEOPLE



THE SCAM BEHIND MYANMAR'S BORDER

Vera Kravtsova was a 26-year-old model from Belarus. In September 2025, she traveled from Thailand to Myanmar, excited about a job opportunity. Her family never heard from her again. Reports said that a few days after she arrived, her family received a ransom letter demanding USD 500,000 to retrieve her body.

It turned out Vera had been coerced into one of the online scam farms operating along the Thai–Myanmar border and she died there. Under international pressure, the family later received a letter of cremation from Myanmar authorities. The cause of death was listed as a heart attack.

Her story captured global attention for a reason. It revealed the dark industry of fraud factories thriving on the border; a network of Chinese-run scam compounds protected by Myanmar's military regime and its allied militias.

Fraud Factories on the Border

In Myawaddy and other border towns, “fraud factories” have turned into one of the largest criminal industries in Southeast Asia. People

from across Asia are lured by fake job offers such as modeling, IT, or customer service positions. When they arrive, their passports are seized, and they are forced to work as online scammers such as running fake romance schemes, investment pitches, or cryptocurrency fraud.

These are not small operations. Hundreds of people are trapped in fenced compounds surrounded by guards and watchtowers. They live under constant surveillance, facing quotas and punishments if they fail. Some survivors describe beatings, electric shocks, and torture for those who resist.

The BBC reported that [at least 100,000 people may have been lured to work in scam centers along the Thai–Myanmar border](#), with Myawaddy becoming the biggest hub.

For the people trapped inside, daily life is a nightmare. Trafficked workers must meet quotas—sometimes defrauding victims of thousands of dollars per week. Failure means punishment. Attempting escape often results in beatings or broken bones.

The question many ask is: how can foreign gangs run massive scam factories with armed guards inside Myanmar? The answer lies in who really controls the land.

The United Nations estimated in 2023 that [hundreds of thousands across Southeast Asia have been trafficked into cyber scam operations, many of them in Myanmar](#). Rescued victims described overcrowded dorms, endless shifts, and psychological abuse designed to make them compliant.

Chinese Gangs in Control

Behind these operations are well-organized Chinese criminal networks. For years, Chinese mafia gangs have operated online scams across Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, shifting locations to evade law enforcement. The chaos in post-coup Myanmar made it the perfect refuge. In February 2025, Thai police estimated that [up to 40 Chinese crime groups were running scam compounds along the border](#), controlling everything from fake tech companies to casinos. These networks target victims globally—including their fellow Chinese citizens—using increasingly sophisticated tactics such as deep-fake videos and “pig butchering” scams, where trust is built over months before financial betrayal.

How the Regime Makes It Possible

The question many ask is: how can foreign gangs run massive scam factories with armed guards inside Myanmar? The answer lies in who really controls the land.

Around the border town of Myawaddy, the Karen Border Guard Force (BGF) holds control. BGF is officially aligned with Myanmar’s military regime. According to a [report](#) from Justice for Myanmar, the BGF leases land to Chinese inves-

tors, supplies electricity and water, and collects “taxes” and protection fees in return. Without their cooperation, the scam compounds could not operate. Investigations by Justice for Myanmar revealed that the BGF and its leaders profit directly from these operations through real-estate, logistics, and utility deals; turning Myawaddy into a lawless commercial zone built on human trafficking and online fraud.

This arrangement didn’t appear overnight. Myanmar’s military created the Border Guard Force system in 2009, granting militias local autonomy in exchange for loyalty. On Thai-Myanmar border, the BGF became both landlord and law enforcer, free to run illicit businesses such as casinos, smuggling routes, and now cyber scam centers. In return, the junta receives loyalty, intelligence, and a steady flow of money. It is not negligence; it’s a deliberate structure of profit and control.

The financial incentives are enormous. Scam compounds generate hundreds of millions of dollars each year. Much of that money, [flows back into military-linked businesses](#) and the personal coffers of officers and militia leaders. By allowing these businesses to thrive, the junta secures both economic gain and territorial influence, particularly in contested ethnic regions.

All these are pointing that Myanmar’s military doesn’t just tolerate these scam networks; it depends on them. By outsourcing control to loyal militias and tolerating crime as long as it funds their rule, the junta maintains an illusion of sovereignty while criminal enterprises flourish under its protection.

The Illusion of Crackdowns

Whenever international attention grows, the regime stages “crackdowns”. In 2025, Thailand and China pressured Myanmar to act. The BGF announced it had deported 10,000 people, while China repatriated nearly 3,000 citizens. But these are rarely genuine reforms. The same forces claiming to shut down the centers are the ones that enabled them. Investigations show that compounds often reopen under new names or relocate deeper into militia-controlled territory. As Justice for Myanmar put it: “We don’t see a crackdown—we see damage control.”

The scam factories are also remarkably resilient thanks to technology. When local electricity and internet were cut, trafficked workers reported that Starlink satellite dishes appeared on rooftops, allowing operations to continue uninterrupted. These compounds switched seamlessly to satellite internet, bypassing official shutdowns and showing how adaptable they are.

SpaceX confirmed in October 2025 that [it had disabled over 2,500 Starlink terminals](#) linked to Myanmar scam operations. Yet even this measure has limits: the infrastructure, militia protection, and financial networks remain intact, enabling operators to resume activities once headlines fade.

In short, what appears as a crackdown is mostly public relations and temporary disruption. The profits, control, and systemic complicity persist. Until the military and its allied militias lose their stake in these operations, nothing will fundamentally change.

No End in Sight

Vera Kravtsova's disappearance is more than a tragedy. It's a symbol of everything wrong with Myanmar's current reality. Her story shows how hope can be weaponized, how opportunity becomes a trap, and how impunity allows crime to flourish. She was one of many who fell victim to a system that blends human trafficking, cyber fraud, and military corruption into one seamless operation.

Ending this will take more than sympathy. It will require international coordination, legal action against military-linked officials, and protection for survivors.

Myanmar's junta must be held accountable; not just for political repression, but for enabling one of the largest human-trafficking networks in modern Asia. Until that happens, more people like Vera will disappear. More families will get ransom messages. More victims around the world will lose their savings to scams powered by enslaved workers.





RECORDING THE ILLEGITIMATE: MYANMAR'S 2025 ELECTION

The regime is holding the election nearly five years after the coup. In regions and areas where they have complete control, they are using only the systems they trust, and relying on the political parties of their friends and acquaintances. This election is considered an exit strategy for the coup; a smooth transition to a so-called “civil” government. They have done everything in their power to make it happen.

We have reported endlessly on why and how the military coup is illegal. Now, we must document and prove that the election is illegal — but in a way that does not legitimize it as a result.

This month, we spoke to one of the seasoned experts on monitoring elections and parliaments in Myanmar.

Please share with us what role you played in the previous elections.

In the 2010 election, there was no such thing as election monitoring. I was also a young person then, only witnessing it from the outside. In 2011, I began working as a reporter in the parliament. After that, I transitioned to working with a civil society organization. During my two years covering the parliament, I realized

that more people should be aware of the issues being discussed there. This realization sparked my interest in promoting public understanding of parliamentary affairs. In 2013, together with other like-minded individuals, I began observing parliamentary activities as part of a civil society initiative. Our goal was to raise public awareness about parliament's work through observation and research. We continued this work during the 2015 election, the 2017 by-election, and the 2020 general election. Unlike short-term observers, our election observation is a long-term process, looking at activities and development before, during, and after elections. Since the electoral system directly shapes emerging parliaments and the political landscape, we believe that monitoring elections also requires continuous observation of parliamentary outcomes and the political landscape that is developed from them.

By the 2015 election, our research group had collected information from the parliament. This information showed which members of parliament had been active over the past five years and which had not. Then we shared this information with the public through various channels so that they could make more informed

Deploying election observers signals that the system recognizes this election as an election worth observing, which it is not. However, what is important is that we must systematically document how the votes are rigged, how the process is manipulated, and how the people's rights are violated.

choices when casting their votes.

In addition, during the election period, we conducted research to help both local and international observers understand the political and parliamentary systems that would emerge from the election. This was our primary involvement. Rather than focusing only on the campaign period or election day itself, our work emphasized long-term monitoring of the political system before and after the election.

This election is based on the 2021 coup, which is widely considered to be illegal, both by the people and the international community. How legitimate is the election organized by the military? There are already several controversies such as voter lists, the limited areas to hold elections, etc. If we get into the irregularities, will it give legitimacy to the entire election? And consequently, will it give legitimacy to this coup?

This issue has been a recurring question since the 2012 by-election. The 2010 election was widely boycotted by civil society and political activists. Reports and media coverage of the 2010 election clearly indicated that the elec-

tion was neither free nor fair. The international community largely accepted that assessment. As a result, the parliaments formed in 2011 and 2012 following that election attracted little public interest or engagement.

Once the NLD entered the parliament with strong nationwide public support in the 2012 by-election, the electoral and parliamentary systems began to gain a measure of legitimacy, rooted in the will of the majority. Therefore, since 2012, the 2008 Constitution has remained in effect, and we have had to acknowledge and operate within that reality, essentially granting it a degree of legitimacy.

Now, when we talk about the 2025 election, it is going to be an election held by the military, backed by guns. It is completely illegal, not only because the military has seized power. If we consider the participation of political parties, there is no legality. Only the military and its allies are involved. Looking at the entire electoral system, it is not truly an election; it is just a show with ballot boxes. In this sense, it has no legitimacy at all.

However, although most civil society organizations boycotted the election in 2010, they also took the initiative to record the extent to which the former military administration oppressed both civil society and ordinary citizens. In essence, this was documentation of widespread human rights violations committed during the election period. This kind of recordkeeping is crucial not only for exposing the truth but also for challenging the legitimacy of the election itself.

So, during the upcoming election period, there is no need to send observers. Sending them would, in effect, grant legitimacy and make you a participant in the election to some extent. Deploying election observers signals that the system recognizes this election as an election worth observing, which it is not. However, what is important is that we must systematically document how the votes are rigged, how the process is manipulated, and how the people's rights are violated. On the ground, the military may resort to violence during the election period, such as coercing or threatening the public. These incidents require monitoring.

If we can clearly demonstrate the ways in which

the process is manipulated and the people's rights are violated, we can also question the foundation of the system that emerges from it. In this scenario, I believe that monitoring such violations is essential and that would not grant the election any legitimacy.

As far as we understand, there are only around six political parties that will contest in the entire country. Elections will take place only in 270 townships, which is very few compared to the elections in the past. They said that they will hold elections in installments. Have you seen this kind of election held in phases before?

There has been no such thing as an election held in phases in modern Myanmar history. I have not studied it. However, in the pre-independence era, elections were held under a system of divided constituencies.

Holding general elections in installments is problematic. General elections are meant to elect a central government that will govern the entire country. If an election for a central government is held with different phases, people's views on candidates at each stage may alter, and the political landscape may not be the same throughout these phases.

For example, the military junta will hold elections only in the areas it controls. By dividing the election into phases, they have many tools at their disposal: buying votes with money, using guns to get the votes, and other methods. Ballot stuffing is another example, fake advance votes, large numbers of ballots stuffed into boxes, or votes stolen in bulk.

In the recent announcements, Yangon is not in the first phase of the election. Yangon is pretty much under military control. It is even beneficial for them to take photographs of people voting and publish them in their media outlets. But if the first election in Yangon is not successful because half of the people do not vote, they will use various methods of violence and pressure to prevent the same outcome in the second phase.

I have not even discussed the results, which they can also manipulate to their advantage. When there is a gap between phases, it seems to me that it is a deliberate design to secure the votes they want. Usually, general elections are

If an election for a central government is held with different phases, people's views on candidates at each stage may alter, and the political landscape may not be the same throughout these phases.

held simultaneously across the country so that campaigning is consistent and public opinion remains stable. Here, however, by observing the initial results, the authorities can anticipate how people might respond and adjust their methods to influence subsequent phases.

The military announced that it would use a Mixed-member Proportional system, combining First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) and Proportional Representation (PR). Is the PR system bad simply because it is implemented by the military? If it were implemented by civilians, could it be beneficial??

Since 2014, there has been a demand in parliament to use the PR system. Smaller parties saw the PR system as an opportunity to gain more seats. They demanded that the PR system be applied only in the lower house, Amyotha Hluttaw. However, these efforts were not successful. Now, Min Aung Hlaing will implement the PR system. The NLD and the majority Bamar parties are no longer on his side, and some parties are likely to boycott. So he is trying to form alliances with ethnic parties that he can influence using the PR system to help them gain more seats in parliament.

The real issue lies in the details. It is not the PR system itself, but how it is designed and implemented that determines whether it serves a fair or manipulative purpose. Now, they are combining PR and FPTP to use in Amyotha Hluttaw. They call it a Mixed-member Proportional system. Six members will be elected using FPTP, and six members will be elected using

PR. That is part of the system. In reality, it is a mixed-member proportional system similar to those used in countries like South Korea, Japan, and some European countries. In such systems, the results from FPTP and PR must be adjusted to balance the overall representation.

The current Mixed-member proportional system implemented by the military junta does not include such an adjustment mechanism. It is a system in which the strongest party wins the majority of the seats. As a result, it is difficult for smaller parties to gain representation. Although it is called a PR system, the very benefits and fairness of proportionality have been removed. Another point is that the PR is applied in Amyotha Hluttaw but not at the state/regional level. In this situation, Min Aung Hlaing claims he wants smaller parties to win by offering PR, but in reality, this is not true.

The 2019 election in Thailand, held under a military dictatorship, is the closest to the regime's proposed system. It caused many problems in Thailand and is no longer in use there. Accepting this electoral system now would mean carrying it forward to the next generation.

From 2010 to 2020, we tried to amend the 2008 Constitution, which we considered flawed and difficult, but we failed. If we accept the system created by Min Aung Hlaing, the democratic mechanisms and processes for the next 10 to

20 years will be severely undermined.

It is not simple for even an expert like you to explain the new electoral system. For ordinary people, it will confuse them quite a lot. Do you think the regime intentionally creates such a system so that people hardly understand and make mistakes?

Normally, if we are going to hold an election with a new system, the first step is to amend the electoral law and engage in discussions with political parties. The parliament must approve these changes. Then, the public will be informed through news coverage. Civil society organizations can follow along by reviewing draft proposals as they are released. Through these discussions, people can understand what the new electoral system will look like and how the voting will take place. Citizens then have the right to participate, evaluate the system, and determine which aspects are acceptable and which are not.

Another issue is that, in a properly organized election, the people responsible for polling stations and the election commissions need to familiarize the election system in advance, often many months before voting begins. When they are familiar with the system, they can identify potential violations. Currently, these election commission officials themselves do not fully understand the new system, laws, or regulations that will govern the election. Now, none of this preparation exists.

Another issue concerns the people who will be in charge of polling stations: those who issue ballots and oversee the voting process. With the electronic voting system, voters may simply press buttons, but hundreds of thousands or even millions of people are responsible for managing the polling stations.

As far as I know, those in charge do not have previous experience like teachers. Many of the experienced staff are part of the CDM, having left their posts after the coup. Now, people with no prior election experience are being assigned to polling stations. These people are not equipped with extensive or thorough training on the election process and the system. Careful preparation and training of polling station staff are crucial for a successful election. The fact that this is not being done is not a strategic choice; it reflects a lack of skill and capacity to

Careful preparation and training of polling station staff are crucial for a successful election. The fact that this is not being done is not a strategic choice; it reflects a lack of skill and capacity to manage the process properly.

If someone doesn't vote, they could be arrested and imprisoned under the Election Protection Act as someone who opposes or refuses to support the election.

manage the process properly.

As I explained earlier, when the military was trying to secure victory using a complicated system, the current Election Commission had to design such a system to guarantee a win for the military. Therefore, the Election Commission does not have enough capacity to follow through the complex system they created.

Another issue is a lack of political will. They have announced that the election will be held in three phases, yet the dates, townships, and details of each phase have not been released. But not only do voters lack this information; political parties planning to contest the election do not seem to know the details. I see no effort to provide clarity. The lack of will is the most evident when they choose not to release basic information which requires no expertise or technical difficulties.

There is no specific information about when the parliament will be called or when the new government will be formed after the three phases of the election. Is this delaying their strategy, or do they not intend to actually call the parliament and form a government? What do you think?

My general guess is that they will complete all three phases of the election in January. Once the results are announced, the process will be finalized by the end of February. The same timeline was followed in 2010 and 2015: the first session of parliament was announced in late February or early March, and a new government was formed in late March or early April. I expect they will follow a similar schedule. I believe they will follow the due process because they want

to undermine the legitimacy of the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) and the National Unity Government (NUG); by attempting to show that their term has expired. I do not think this will be a prolonged process.

Regarding the voting method, it has been announced that electronic voting with Unique Identifier (UID) numbers will be used. How risky is this system for voters?

If we are going to use an electronic voting system, the key requirement is ensuring the integrity of the system. People need to trust the system and data behind the system: how it is stored, where it is stored, who manages it, and how the system is developed. For the system to be truly trustworthy, all of this must be guaranteed. For example, if an electronic voting system is used in an election conducted by an independent election commission under a civilian government, the commission must clearly communicate to the public: where this system was purchased, where the hardware was sourced, the company that developed it, or if the software ensured integrity, prevent fraud, and correctly calculate the results, how the information you enter when you vote will be stored in the machine, and for how long, who have access to it, etc. We have no information about any of this, and that is why I find this system hard to trust.

What's even more concerning is the use of the UID. The UID will be used to force people to register to vote. Once registered, people are already in the system. Through the UID, authorities will know people's personal information and whether they vote or not. If someone doesn't vote, they could be arrested and imprisoned under the Election Protection Act as someone who opposes or refuses to support the election. Even if they are not imprisoned, they could still be tracked.

We don't know how the military will use this data if it falls into their hands. Even if a civilian government comes to power, what will happen if the military continues to oppress because it still has access to the data? This may seem like a fear-mongering scenario, but I believe it is a very real and worrying concern.

The regime has issued various laws regarding the election, which prevents citizens from criticising the election. That is the domestic situation. Another thing is that some interna-

tional election observers will not be sending election observer teams to avoid giving any legitimacy, so there will be little to no discussion about the election inside and outside the country. What will be the consequences of this issue?

Domestically, people will be suppressed through various laws, mechanisms, and methods. The amendment of the Protection of Personal Privacy and Personal Security of Citizens Law is extremely important. It means that the military junta's mechanisms can spy on people, listen to their phone calls, and enter their homes without a warrant. They can also arrest people on the street and search them. Once arrested, individuals may be detained for more than 24 hours without their whereabouts being disclosed.

On the other hand, there is the Cyber Security Law. People have been arrested simply for using a VPN under this law. Similarly, under the Election Protection Law, individuals can be arrested for making statements about the election. Even those who want to monitor the election cannot do so, as criticizing or analyzing the process can lead to arrest. It is not easy for people to abstain from voting in such a context. With widespread surveillance and pressure, citizens can be coerced into polling stations and forced to vote. This is not merely a hypothetical scenario; it is a real threat.

People abroad cannot go to the ground to monitor the elections directly. What they can do, however, is document human rights violations that occur during the election period. Even though we are not observing the elections directly, we must continue to monitor the human rights abuses that increase during the election period.

Our people, after all we have endured, have a strong desire to respond to such circumstances. I believe we will find a way. We will be able to document human rights violations during the election period. I believe that documentation will continue to be carried out by citizen journalists. For those outside the country, the key questions are: how do we collect this information safely, and how do we transmit it to international mechanisms? How do we ensure it reaches international media? I believe these steps are crucial.

By doing so, we can record for history that this election was not a legitimate election. Only by documenting it in this way can we undermine

the political system emerging from the election and the authority of those who come to power through it.

If we accept this election, our next generation may face even worse consequences. Our country and our land should never become a place where democracy, human rights, and federalism fail to develop. We can't let the military junta use the election as its exit strategy. I believe we need to work together to put on record that this is not a genuine election.

Would you like to add any final remarks?

When we talk about elections, people in the country always ask, "What should we do? We are being forced to go to the polling station. We are pressured and threatened." In my opinion, if citizens have no real choice, they will have to go to the polling station and vote. We all have to understand that reality.

What we need to do, both domestically and internationally, is work together and share information about the situations and events we are facing. Today, we have more ways to share information than ever before. We need to document and share our experiences, the abuses and threats we have faced, and the injustices we have witnessed. These are all violations of human rights and political rights. By documenting these violations, we can ensure that the world is informed and that these events are recorded in history. When we seek truth and justice, it is essential to document this election as a tactic of the military rather than a genuine electoral process. To document the violations, incidents, experiences, threats, and acts of violence we have faced, I encourage everyone not to stop at personal levels. We should use safe methods to record, share, and archive this information collectively.

Another point is that those abroad, whether civil society organizations or media outlets, shall work together to collect and integrate this information. I believe we should all collaborate to systematically document these events. I do not believe that our country will remain in conflict forever. We have faith that one day it will become an independent nation, free from military dictatorship.

I believe in every citizen and every soldier who participates, whether they are inside or outside the country. Each of us has the desire, the ability, and the purpose to contribute. I strongly encourage everyone to work together to make this happen.

KEY EVENTS OF ARMED RESISTANCE

Control of Territory

In 2025, the regime has managed to retake several regions previously under resistance control, largely due to Chinese government intervention. Since the 2021 coup, resistance forces have captured and administered a total of 104 towns across the country. Of these, the military junta has since recaptured 13 towns, leaving 91 towns still under the control of resistance groups.




Figure 1: Towns controlled by resistance forces and recaptured by the regime

Towns Recaptured by the Junta

In Shan State, the regime regained the highest number of towns such as Lashio, Hsihseng, Nawngkhio, Kyaukme, and Hsipaw; all of which have fallen back under its control. In Sagaing Region, resistance groups lost Kawlin, Kani, and Thabeikkyin. In Karenni State the towns of Moebye, and Demoso were recaptured by the junta. And in Karen State, the resistance forces have lost control of Laykawkaw Town, Thingan-yinaung and Myawaddy, the former two being key tactical operations command bases.

Furthermore, the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) announced a ceasefire on October 28, 2025, agreeing to withdraw from Mogok and Momeik, towns it had controlled since July 2024. In return, the regime pledged to halt ground assaults and airstrikes on TNLA-held areas.




Figure 2: Number of towns currently under resistance forces

Among those opposing the regime, the Arakan Army (AA) and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) continue to hold every town they have captured. However, the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the Kokang Army (Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, MNDAA), the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA), and the NUG's People's Defense Force (PDF) have lost some towns to the regime.

Airstrikes and Casualties

Aerial attacks continue to pose the greatest threat from the regime to both resistance forces and civilians. In 2025 alone, the military conducted over 4,000 aerial strikes, with the most targeted regions being Sagaing, Kachin, Magway, and Tanintharyi. Among them, a total of 2607 incidents took place with casualties. More than 2000 people including children and women were killed in those incidents.




Figure 3: Regime's aerial strikes across Myanmar in 2025

Casualties from Aerial Strikes

Among these, a total of 2,607 incidents resulted in casualties, causing the deaths of more than 2,000 people, including children and women. Since the beginning of the year, the aerial attacks have accelerated especially after the Mandalay earthquake in March.




Figure 4: Number of aerial strikes and related fatalities in 2025

The regime has diversified its methods including the use of paragliders for low-cost, discreet strikes while continuing large-scale bombings by helicopters and fighter jets, which remain the dominant form of attack in 2025.

3017 **Air Strikes** 

474 **Paramotor** 

455 **Drone** 

68 **Gyrocopter** 