When it comes to Chinese involvement in Myanmar’s conflict, it has been a hectic month. As an opening act, Min Aung Hlaing visited China for the first time since the coup to attend the Greater Mekong Subregion Summit. According to reports, topics agreed upon with China include the injection of a huge sum of funds to support the faltering junta and his administration, the State Administration Council (SAC), and military hardware (Min Aung Hlaing was seen visiting drone and other military manufacturing sites) among other things.
However, the two greatest shocks come in the form of 1) Chinese detaining the head of Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), a powerful Kokang ethnic armed organization (EAO) that has expanded its territories massively post-coup, and 2) China and SAC agreeing on the operation of Chinese private military companies (PMC) in Myanmar.
Regarding the first issue, it has become even more problematic considering MNDAA head, Mr. Peng Daxun, was in China under the invitation of the Chinese foreign ministry for a meeting with its East Asia Special Envoy, only to get reportedly detained after the meeting. We are not well-versed in diplomatic protocols and thus cannot comment whether such “detaining the invitee of a diplomatic talk” behavior is in accordance with present-day international norms. However, what we see is China willingly throwing away its mediator position. Since the turn of the year, a few months from the first wave of Operation 1027, with town after town falling to the hands of Three Brotherhood Alliance forces, where MNDAA is a key member, China has pressured them and other EAOs in Myanmar to sue for peace, to reject the NUG and its armed wing PDF fighters, and to acknowledge the role of junta’s military in present and future of Myanmar. Chinese pressure proved too great at times that The Brotherhood agreed to a ceasefire in Northern Shan State in January. While the tenuous ceasefire did not last China chose a blend of diplomacy and coercion before.
However, with the arrest of Peng Daxun, China has clearly signaled its stance of forsaking diplomacy and going pure coercion. Such reckless action could backfire for China, however, the arrogant Chinese authorities seem to believe that they can overcome any resistance provided enough force is applied.
And that thinking gets to the next shock of Chinese private military companies (PMCs) to expand operations in Myanmar. Chinese PMCs operating in Myanmar is not a novel idea. News reports have long indicated the presence of these Chinese private armed soldiers guarding Chinese large-scale investment sites. However, the shift is its announcement and the unprecedentedly larger scale. The first of such assignments seems to be in Rakhine State, where the Arakan Army (AA), another Brotherhood member, is gaining ground rapidly at a place where major Chinese projects are under development. The Chinese PMCs planned operations will not stop in Rakhine alone, and the Chinese projects are spread across the country. Some observers correctly claim that allowing Chinese PMCs to operate within Myanmar is a shameful and cowardly behavior from the losing junta and unconstitutional, even according to the military-drafted 2008 constitution. However, the way we see is that the junta will not mind. At the current rate, the junta risks losing everything, and if the regime could maintain power by inviting Chinese PMCs, they would do so. After all, losing face is way better than losing head. The biggest problem the junta is facing is that their soldiers are losing morale, unwilling to fight, and ready to surrender at the sight of a well-armed enemy. Having Chinese military contractors will help alleviate this problem in areas where major Chinese projects are running. There will still be huge coordination challenges between SAC troops and Chinese PMC troops, such as whether these Chinese private soldiers, who are presumably better compensated and have higher morale, would listen to SAC commanders. Or how much autonomy be allowed to the Chinese troops? However, the biggest complication and challenge lies not with SAC, but with the revolution side.
These Chinese armed soldiers are going to be posted in Myanmar to protect Chinese interests in Myanmar. While national interest is not a disagreeable concept, the likelihood that they act proactively or aggressively, rather than simply reacting to threats, is concerning. Worse, since the coup, Chinese project sites that housed SAC troops have been launching pads for the junta’s soldier’s incursion into the nearby communities. Will the Chinese private security forces be posted there only for guard duty? or more?
Russia’s PMCs, such as the Wagner Group, have been important pillars supporting pro-Russian dictators in Africa and the Middle East, such as those in Syria, Mali, Central African Republic, etc. China, unlike Russia, has yet to take such a heavy-handed approach to the authoritarian regimes it supports. Then again, no authoritarian regime in the Chinese sphere of influence is under heavy siege like Min Aung Hlaing’s. Now that the Chinese government has thrown its support blatantly and shamelessly behind Min Aung Hlaing, what could be the consequences if these Chinese private soldiers got killed under fire from the revolutionary side? Chances are that China would not mourn the deaths of its soldiers but use it as a justification to rump up support for Min Aung Hlaing. The alternative of giving in to all demands of Chinese private soldiers is not appealing to the revolution side either. The entry of Chinese troops in support of junta Min Aung Hlaing would prove to be the most delicate and complicated challenge pro-revolutionary fighters, be it EAOs or NUG or PDF, face yet.
However, that still does not mean there is no solution. When the external threats get real, we need to rise to the challenge, and right now we face the biggest threat to the success of the revolution.
In reflection of the revolutionary forces, despite military success and territorial expansion, our problem lies in our inability to achieve similar success in terms of political agreement. The claim of federal democracy has been in place since the first few months after the coup. However, upon wondering what it means by federal democracy and how we are going to get there, it becomes vague. Worse, some EAOs later even talk about different arrangements. Sadly, from the way we see, the current coalition of pro-revolution is more akin to an alliance of convenience among different stakeholders rather than a fully committed and coordinated force. The fact that our revolution has gotten this far is a testament to the grit and determination of the people of Myanmar. The people are fueling the downfall of the junta with their lives and livelihoods. With China now throwing its support openly and massively behind the junta, we simply cannot afford to continue that way. Back in 2015, Russia’s support for the al-Assad regime in Syria proved to be a decisive factor in the Syrian dictator getting the upper hand in the civil war from the brink of defeat. Had a global superpower like China decided to support SAC enough, it would be very difficult for us to overcome.
Having said that, difficult is not impossible. We could still make China regret ever backing the junta. We could still make the cost of supporting the junta so sky-high that the Chinese government will eventually find it unsustainable. We could still be true to the people of Myanmar who stand firm in the face of the onslaught.
However, the revolutionary leadership would need to get a political agreement first so that all pro-revolutionary actors would truly align as one. Min Aung Hlaing will be gone with or without Chinese support. But China is a force no actor can face alone. Heading towards federal democracy and staying true to it would be the only way out.
