Vera Kravtsova was a 26-year-old model from Belarus. In September 2025, she traveled from Thailand to Myanmar, excited about a job opportunity. Her family never heard from her again. Reports said that a few days after she arrived, her family received a ransom letter demanding USD 500,000 to retrieve her body.
It turned out Vera had been coerced into one of the online scam farms operating along the Thai–Myanmar border and she died there. Under international pressure, the family later received a letter of cremation from Myanmar authorities. The cause of death was listed as a heart attack.
Her story captured global attention for a reason. It revealed the dark industry of fraud factories thriving on the border; a network of Chinese-run scam compounds protected by Myanmar’s military regime and its allied militias.
Fraud Factories on the Border
In Myawaddy and other border towns, “fraud factories” have turned into one of the largest criminal industries in Southeast Asia. People from across Asia are lured by fake job offers such as modeling, IT, or customer service positions. When they arrive, their passports are seized, and they are forced to work as online scammers such as running fake romance schemes, investment pitches, or cryptocurrency fraud.
These are not small operations. Hundreds of people are trapped in fenced compounds surrounded by guards and watchtowers. They live under constant surveillance, facing quotas and punishments if they fail. Some survivors describe beatings, electric shocks, and torture for those who resist.
The BBC reported that at least 100,000 people may have been lured to work in scam centers along the Thai–Myanmar border, with Myawaddy becoming the biggest hub.
For the people trapped inside, daily life is a nightmare. Trafficked workers must meet quotas—sometimes defrauding victims of thousands of dollars per week. Failure means punishment. Attempting escape often results in beatings or broken bones.
The United Nations estimated in 2023 that hundreds of thousands across Southeast Asia have been trafficked into cyber scam operations, many of them in Myanmar. Rescued victims described overcrowded dorms, endless shifts, and psychological abuse designed to make them compliant.
Chinese Gangs in Control
Behind these operations are well-organized Chinese criminal networks. For years, Chinese mafia gangs have operated online scams across Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, shifting locations to evade law enforcement. The chaos in post-coup Myanmar made it the perfect refuge.
In February 2025, Thai police estimated that up to 40 Chinese crime groups were running scam compounds along the border, controlling everything from fake tech companies to casinos. These networks target victims globally—including their fellow Chinese citizens—using increasingly sophisticated tactics such as deepfake videos and “pig butchering” scams, where trust is built over months before financial betrayal.
How the Regime Makes It Possible
The question many ask is: how can foreign gangs run massive scam factories with armed guards inside Myanmar? The answer lies in who really controls the land.
Around the border town of Myawaddy, the Karen Border Guard Force (BGF) holds control. BGF is officially aligned with Myanmar’s military regime. According to a report from Justice for Myanmar, the BGF leases land to Chinese investors, supplies electricity and water, and collects “taxes” and protection fees in return. Without their cooperation, the scam compounds could not operate. Investigations by Justice for Myanmar revealed that the BGF and its leaders profit directly from these operations through real-estate, logistics, and utility deals; turning Myawaddy into a lawless commercial zone built on human trafficking and online fraud.
This arrangement didn’t appear overnight. Myanmar’s military created the Border Guard Force system in 2009, granting militias local autonomy in exchange for loyalty. On Thai-Myanmar border, the BGF became both landlord and law enforcer, free to run illicit businesses such as casinos, smuggling routes, and now cyber scam centers. In return, the junta receives loyalty, intelligence, and a steady flow of money. It is not negligence; it’s a deliberate structure of profit and control.
The financial incentives are enormous. Scam compounds generate hundreds of millions of dollars each year. Much of that money, flows back into military-linked businesses and the personal coffers of officers and militia leaders. By allowing these businesses to thrive, the junta secures both economic gain and territorial influence, particularly in contested ethnic regions.
All these are pointing that Myanmar’s military doesn’t just tolerate these scam networks; it depends on them. By outsourcing control to loyal militias and tolerating crime as long as it funds their rule, the junta maintains an illusion of sovereignty while criminal enterprises flourish under its protection.
The Illusion of Crackdowns
Whenever international attention grows, the regime stages “crackdowns”. In 2025, Thailand and China pressured Myanmar to act. The BGF announced it had deported 10,000 people, while China repatriated nearly 3,000 citizens. But these are rarely genuine reforms. The same forces claiming to shut down the centers are the ones that enabled them. Investigations show that compounds often reopen under new names or relocate deeper into militia-controlled territory. As Justice for Myanmar put it: “We don’t see a crackdown—we see damage control.”
The scam factories are also remarkably resilient thanks to technology. When local electricity and internet were cut, trafficked workers reported that Starlink satellite dishes appeared on rooftops, allowing operations to continue uninterrupted. These compounds switched seamlessly to satellite internet, bypassing official shutdowns and showing how adaptable they are.
SpaceX confirmed in October 2025 that it had disabled over 2,500 Starlink terminals linked to Myanmar scam operations. Yet even this measure has limits: the infrastructure, militia protection, and financial networks remain intact, enabling operators to resume activities once headlines fade.
In short, what appears as a crackdown is mostly public relations and temporary disruption. The profits, control, and systemic complicity persist. Until the military and its allied militias lose their stake in these operations, nothing will fundamentally change.
No End in Sight
Vera Kravtsova’s disappearance is more than a tragedy. It’s a symbol of everything wrong with Myanmar’s current reality. Her story shows how hope can be weaponized, how opportunity becomes a trap, and how impunity allows crime to flourish. She was one of many who fell victim to a system that blends human trafficking, cyber fraud, and military corruption into one seamless operation.
Ending this will take more than sympathy. It will require international coordination, legal action against military-linked officials, andprotection for survivors.
Myanmar’s junta must be held accountable; not just for political repression, but for enabling one of the largest human-trafficking networks in modern Asia. Until that happens, more people like Vera will disappear. More families will get ransom messages. More victims around the world will lose their savings to scams powered by enslaved workers.
